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SURETYSHIP AND INDEMNITY IN BRITISH AND IRISH LAW 
Chapter 1 
SURETYSHIP AND INDEMNITY : BASIC CONCEPTS 
Introduction 
Territories covered - This study covers the following territories : 
1. England and Wales (England and Wales form a single legal unit; 
therefore when there is a reference to "England" it may be 
assumed that what is said applies to Wales as well). 
2. Scotland. 
3. Northern Ireland. 
4. The Republic of Ireland. 
England and both parts of Ireland are Common Law countries and the 
law is normally the same in all these territories except where there 
is different legislation. The Scottish legal system is based 
partly on Roman Law but in the area of this study the law is often 
similar to that in England. For these reasons the study will deal 
primarily with England ; the other territories will be mentioned 
only where their law differs from that of England (1). 
Terminology - The term "personal security" will be used in the same 
sense as in the Study prepared by the Max-Planck-Institut, (2) i.e. 
it covers all contractual devices that fulfil the same economic 
function as suretyship. 
(1) See pp. 2-5 of my study on the internal law of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the field of property law 
(XIV/426/72-E) hereinafter cited as my "Report on Property". 
(2) The Suretyship in the Law of the Member states of the European 
Communities, prepared by the Max-Planck-Institut für 
ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht (Hamburg 1973), paras. 
1 and 2. This Study is hereafter referred to as the "Max-Planck-
Institut Study". A difficulty arises with regard to the term "guarantee". In the 
Max-Planck-Institut Study this term is used, with reference to 
Dutch and German law, to describe an undertaking which is not 
accessory in character, i.e. in which the guarantor is obliged to 
pay even if the claim against the principal debtor is not legally 
valid (1)· This is in contrast to a normal suretyship in which the 
liability of the surety is generally co-extensive with that of the 
principal debtor so that if the debtor is not legally obliged to 
pay, the surety is not liable either. 
The distinction between these two kinds of contract is fully 
recognised in English law; unfortunately, however, the terminology 
is different : the word "guarantee" is applied to the narrower 
undertaking and means the same thing as a suretyshio. The wider 
undertaking is called a contract of indemnity. In this study, 
therefore, the term "guarantee" will not be used in the same sense 
as in the Max-Planck-Institut Study : it will be used to mean 
exactly the same thing as "surety". An undertaking which falls 
outside the definition of a guarantee will be called an 
indemnity (2). 
Suretyship (Guarantee) 
Suretyship (guarantee) is a contract where the surety (guarantor) 
undertakes to be answerable to the creditor for the liability of 
the principal debtor whose primary liability to the creditor must 
exist or be contemplated. There must therefore be an existing or 
contemplated obligation on the part of the principal debtor to the 
creditor and the validity of the contract of suretyshio is normally 
dependent on tnat of the principal obligation. 
It has been held (in Sutton & Co. v. Grey) (3) that a contract 
cannot be one of guarantee if the guarantor was connected with the 
creation of the primary obligation and derives a benefit from it. 
In that case a firm of stockbrokers agreed with Grey that the 
latter would be entitled to half the commission earned through 
clients he introduced and that he would be liable for half the 
losses sustained in regard to them. It was held that the contract 
was not one of guarantee since Grey derived a benefit from the 
creation of the original liability. It was consequently a contract 
of indemnity. For the same reason a del credere agent's contract 
is not one of guarantee (suretyship) (4). 
It will be apparent from the definition given above that the 
primary obligation may be created either before or after the 
suretyship. Where it is created after the suretyship (i.e. where 
the suretyship is to guarantee future liability) it may be made in 
respect of a single specified transaction or for an indefinite 
series of transactions. In this latter case it is called a 
continuing guarantee : the surety may, for example, guarantee all 
debts contracted by the principal debtor in his dealings with the 
(1) Ibid, paras. 12 and 29. 
(2) See below paras. 10-13, for definitions 
(3) (1894) 1 Q.B. 285. 
(4) See para. 36, below. creditor. The surety may, of course, limit his liability either by 
specifying a time limit or a financial ¿.imit. In either case 
difficult questions of construction may arise. 
9. Scotland - In Scotland the general concept of suretyship is the 
same as in England and the above definition applies in Scotland as 
well as in England; however, there is a difference in terminology : 
the normal term for suretyship is "cautionary obligation" and the 
surety is called a "cautioner". The English terms are also used, 
however, and in this Report it will normally be more convenient to 
use English terminology with regard to all the systems of law under 
study. 
Indemnity 
10. The term "indemnity" is used in several senses. These are : first, 
in the widest sense it means an obligation to make good any loss 
suffered by the person indemnified. This loss may result from the 
failure of a third party to carry out his obligations towards the 
person indemnified or it may result from liability incurred by the 
person indemnified towards a third person. The obligation to 
indemnify may result from contract or from operation of law. One 
example of an indemnity in this sense is found in the law of 
suretyship itself : if the surety pays the debt to the creditor, he 
has the right to claim an indemnity from the debtor (1). 
11. The second meaning of the term is limited to an obligation arising 
out of a contract. In this sense the term includes contracts of 
suretyship, many contracts of insurance and other contracts. 
12. The third meaning is the narrowest. When used in this sense it is 
used in contrast to a contract of suretyship. Here it refers to a 
contract in which the indemnifier undertakes to make good any loss 
suffered by the person indemnified as a result of his entering into 
a given transaction. The difference between an indemnity (in this 
sense) and a suretyship is that the indemnity is an independent 
(primary) obligation; the suretyship is a collateral, accessory or 
secondary obligation. This distinction is discussed below. (2) 
13. It should finally be mentioned that a contract which would be one 
of suretyship but for the fact that the "surety" has an interest in 
the principal obligation is also called an indemnity. This 
conflicts with the definition just given (third meaning) because in 
this case the obligation may be a collateral or secondary one. It 
is, however, convenient to include such a transaction in the 
concept of an indemnity (third meaning); therefore in this Report 
the term "indemnity" will be used in the third sense discussed 
above except that a transaction of the kind just mentioned 'will be 
included within the concept. 
14. Finally, it should be said that it is not very easy to distinguish 
indemnity (in the third sense) from insurance. It is true that 
indemnity (in the wider sense) includes insurance ; in the narrow 
(1) See below, paras. 110-15 
(2) See below, paras. 16-22. sense it presumably does not; but there is no clear authority as to 
exactly what is the criterion for distinguishing between them. 
This is partly because the law relating to indemnities is not very 
well developed - unlike the law of suretyship and insurance. It 
may not be very important in practice to make this distinction; but 
there are probably some situations in which it would have to be 
done : for example, it is probable (although there is no clear 
authority) that a contract of indemnity is, like a contract of 
suretyship, not a contract uberrimae fidei (1). A contract of 
insurance is. If, therefore there was a failure to disclose a 
relevant fact, the validity of the contract might depend on whether 
it was indemnity or insurance. If the courts had to determine into 
which category a given contract fell, it is probable that, if other 
indications failed, it would see whether a payment in the nature of 
a premium was made by the person insured/indemnified. If there 
was, it would be regarded as insurance; if not, it would probably 
be an indemnity. 
15. Since the law of indemnity is much less developed than the law of 
suretyship this Report will concentrate on the latter. However, 
the differences will be pointed out where appropriate. Two 
important differences are : first, that an indemnity may be valid 
even though the "principal" obligation is invalid (e.g. for lack of 
capacity) (2); secondly, that there is no requirement that an 
indemnity be in writing (3). 
Accessory Character of Suretyship 
16. Suretyship is an accessory, secondary or collateral contract (4). 
By this is meant that it cannot exist on its own : there must be 
some other contract (the principal obligation) to which it relates. 
This does not mean that the suretyship must always come into 
existence after the principal obligation. It is enough if the 
principal obligation is envisaged at the time when the suretyship 
is entered into. Of course, if the principal obligation never 
comes into existence, the suretyship will never be effective. 
17. It follows from this that, as a general rule, the suretyship will 
be invalid if the principal obligation is invalid. This is the 
crucial distinction between suretyship (guarantee) and indemnity. 
An indemnity is not an accessory or collateral obligation. The 
indemnifier is primary liable. The difference between the two 
contracts can be best summed up as follows : a surety promises in 
effect : "If the debtor does not pay what he owes, I will pay it". 
The indemnifier says to the creditor : "If you suffer a loss as a 
result of this transaction, I will make good that loss". 
18. The distinction between these two kinds of contract is especially 
important where the principal debtor is a minor. In the case of a 
contract of suretyship it has been held that the surety is not 
liable. This was the decision in the case of Coutts & Co. v. 
(1) See para. 72. 
(2) See para. 19. 
(3) See paras. 65 and 68. 
(4) In this Report all these terms mean the same thing Browne-Lecky (1) in which the plaintiffs, a well known bank, lent 
money to a minor on an overdraft. There were two joint guarantors 
for the debt but the court held, first, that since the debtor was a 
minor the bank could not recover against him. (It is expressly 
provided by section 1 of the Infants Relief Act 1874 that a 
contract entered into by a minor for the repayment of money lent is 
"absolutely void"). Secondly, that, since the principal obligation 
was invalid, the guarantee was also invalid. The sureties were not, 
therefore, obliged to pay. 
19. This case has been criticised (2) on the ground that all the 
parties knew that the principal debtor was a minor. However, there 
is an easy way round this rule of law : all the creditor has to do 
is to require that a contract of indemnity be entered into, instead 
of one of suretyship. If this is done, the indemnifier will be 
liable. The question whether a particular contract is one of 
indemnity or one of suretyship is decided by interpreting the 
intention of the parties. The mere use of the term "indemnity" is 
not in itself conclusive (3) . 
20. It should be mentioned that there are a number of decisions that 
seem to run counter to the principle of the accessory character of 
suretyship. These cases lay down that if a company enters into an 
ultra vires contract and one or more of the directors guarantees 
that contract, the guarantor will be liable even though the company 
will not (4). These cases may constitute an exception to the rule; 
but it is also possible that they could be explained on the ground 
that the true nature of the undertaking in them was indemnity not 
guarantee (5). 
21. One can conclude that the law is not entirely settled on this point. 
One can, however, be fairly sure of one thing : if the principal 
contract is illegal (in the sense of being a criminal offence) or if, 
to the knowledge of the parties, it was entered into with a view to 
committing a criminal offence, or if it is immoral or otherwise 
contrary to public policy, then the guarantee will also be void. 
This would no doubt apply to a contract of indemnity as well. 
22. Scotland - The law of Scotland is probably the same as that of 
England on this point, though there might be some differences of 
detail (6) . 
(1) (1946) 2 All E.R. 207; (1947) K.B. 104. See also Stadium Finance 
Co. Ltd. v. Helm (1965) 109 Sol. Jo. 471. 
(2) See E.J. Cohn, "Validity of Guarantees of Debts of Minors" (1947) 
10 Modern Law Review 40 (a comparative study) and M.P. Furmston, 
"Infants' contracts - La Nouvelle Vague?" (1961) 24 Mod. Law 
Review 644. 
(3) See Yeoman Credit Ltd. v. Latter (1961) 2 All. E.R. 294. 
(4) See Yorkshire Railway Wagon Co. v. Maclure (1881) 19 Ch. D. 478; 
Garrard v. James (1925) Τ Ch. 616 
(5) This view is borne out by the comments of Lawrence J. in Garrard v. 
James (1925) 1 Ch. 616 at 623 where he says that the true nature of 
the undertaking was that the defendants agreed that they would pay 
if the company did not. 
(6) See Gloag and Henderson, p. 220 and Gow, p. 307. Chapter 2 
OTHER PERSONAL SECURITIES 
Joint Debtors 
23. In English law it is necessary to distinguish between three cases : 
joint debtors, several (separate) debtors, and joint and several 
debtors. Several (separate) debtors are debtors subject to 
separate obligations : e.g. D(1) agrees to pay C £10 and D(2) 
agrees separately to pay C another £10. There are two separate 
obligations (even though they may be contained in the same 
document) : each debtor is liable for only £10 but the creditor can 
get a total of £20. 
24. If, however, D(1) and D(2) jointly agree to pay C £10, there is 
only one debt. C can recover this from either debtor (or both at 
the same time) but he cannot get more than £10 in total. If one 
debtor pays, the other is discharged. The creditor can choose 
which debtor to sue but the debtor being sued can normally have the 
other debtor joined to the proceedings as co-defendant. There is 
also a right of contribution between joint debtors : if one pays, 
he can demand that the other(s) pay his/their share(s). In the 
absence of an agreement in the contract, each joint debtor must pay 
an equal share. 
25. Joint and several liability is in most ways similar to joint 
liability. If D(1) and D(2) agree jointly and severally to pay 
C £10 there is again only one debt but it is created by three 
promises : the several promise of D(1) to C, the several promise of 
D(2) to C, and the joint promise of D(1) and D(2) to C. Since there 
is only one debt, what has been said above concerning a joint debt 
applies here as well. There are, however, differences : if one 
joint debtor dies, his obligation does not pass to his personal 
representative (i.e. the person who succeeds to his estate) and the 
debt remains solely with the other joint debtor(s) (1). But if a 
joint and several debtor dies, the obligation does pass to his 
personal representative. (It is said that the several obligation 
passes to the personal representative and the joint obligation 
passes to the surviving joint debtor(s)). Another difference is 
that if the creditor sues one of the joint debtors and obtains a 
judgement against him, he cannot subsequently sue the other joint 
debtors, even if the judgement is unsatisfied (2). This is not the 
case with a joint and several debt. (It is said that though there 
is only one debt there are as many causes of action as there are 
promises. Therefore the other debtors can be sued on their several 
promises) . If a judgement against a joint and several debtor is 
satisfied, the debt is discharged and the other debtors cannot be 
sued. 
(1) Compare the position where a joint owner of property dies : see my 
Report on Property Law, p. 24 (Ch. 2). 
(2) For this reason the creditor would be well advised to sue all the 
joint debtors together. 
8 26. Joints debts (and joint and several debts) have some similarities 
with guarantees but there are also differences. A surety 
(guarantor) is normally entitled to be repaid the whole amount by 
the principal debtor if the surety is obliged to pay the creditor; 
a joint debtor is normally entitled to only half (if there are two 
joint debtors). However, this rule can be varied by agreement. 
27. If the creditor releases one joint debtor, the others are also 
released. Likewise, in the case of suretyship, if the creditor 
releases the principal debtor, this also releases the surety. But 
if the creditor releases the surety, this does not affect the 
obligation of the principal debtor. 
28. Other differences are : 
(1) A surety is not obliged to pay if the principal debtor is 
not liable, even if he escapes liability by reason of his 
incapacity; but if one joint debtor escapes liability by 
reason of such a defence, the liability of the other(s) is 
not affected. 
(2) Under the Statute of Frauds a contract of guarantee must be 
in writing; this rule does not apply to a joint debt. 
(3) If one joint debtor dies the liability does not pass to his 
personal representative. (This is not true in the case of 
a joint and several debtor) . But in the case of suretyship 
the liability of both the principal debtor and of the 
surety passes to their personal representatives on their 
death. 
(4) If the creditor obtains a judgement against one joint 
debtor he cannot sue the other (even if the judgement is 
unsatisfied) (1). But, in the case of suretyship, the fact 
that the creditor has obtained a judgement against the 
principal debtor does not (provided the judgement is 
unsatisfied) prevent him from suing the surety; the same 
applies if the creditor first sues the surety (2). 
29. There is no doubt that a joint debt can (and sometimes does) fulfil 
the same economic function as a guarantee. However, as joint debts 
are excluded from the Max-Planck-Institut Report, they will be 
excluded here too. 
NOTE : For citations of cases on the points mentioned in this 
section see : Sutton and Shannon on Contracts (7th ed. 1970), 
pp. 536-42. 
30. Scotland - In Scotland the position is somewhat different. There 
the debtors may be bound either pro rata or in solidum. If they 
are bound pro rata each is liable to the creditor for his share of 
the debt only. Unless the contrary is agreed, each is liable for 
an equal share. If they are liable in solidum, each is liable to 
the creditor for the whole debt; but if one debtor pays the whole 
(1) This is not the case in regard to a joint and several debt 
(2) See Rowlatt, p. 66, citing Bermondsay v. Ramsey (1871) 
L.R. 6 S.P. 247 at 257. debt, he can claim against the other debtors for their share. 
Among themselves, debtors in solidum are liable for an equal share 
unless the contrary is agreed. 
31 . It will be seen from this that liability in solidum in Scottish law 
is equivalent to joint liability in English law. Unfortunately, 
however, there is a terminological difficulty : in Scots law if A 
and Β agree to be bound "jointly" this means that they are bound 
pro rata. If they agree to be bound "jointly and severally" they 
will be liable in solidum. Thus the English terminology has been 
given a different meaning in Scotland from what it has in England. 
32. If the parties have not made clear whether the obligation is 
pro rata or in solidum there is a general presumption that it is 
prorata. This presumption applies in the case of a cautionary 
obligation (suretyship). There are, however, a number of important 
exceptions where the presumption is that the obligation is in 
solidum. Thus in the case of a negotiable instrument liabiTTty is 
in solTdum and if two or more persons together order goods or 
services, they are liable in solidum. 
33. As in the case of a joint obligation in English law, if the 
creditor frees one debtor in solidum, he discharges the others 
unless he expressly reserves his right against them (in which case 
the remaining debtors retain their right for a contribution from 
the debtor who has been freed). 
34. The English distinction between, on the one hand, joint liability 
and, on the other hand, joint and several liability does not seem 
to apply in Scotland. 
NOTE : For further discussion see : Gow, pp. 21-2; Gloag and 
Henderson, p. 35. 
Del Credere Agents 
35. A del credere agent is an agent employed to sell goods who agrees 
(usually in return for a greater commission) to guarantee that the 
buyers of the goods will pay for them. At one time it was thought 
that the agent's liability was primary (independent) (1) but it now 
seems clear that it is secondary (accessory) only (2). Thus the 
agent is liable only if the buyer fails to pay what he is legally 
obliged to pay. He is also not liable for a breach of contract by 
the buyer other than a refusal to pay the price of the goods. Thus 
it has been held that a del credere agent is not liable if the buyer 
refuses to accept the goods (3). One can, therefore, conclude that 
the del credere agent is merely a guarantor of the solvency of the 
buyer. 
36. The contract is not, however, stricltly speaking one of guarantee 
(suretyship) because the agent is not unconnected with the 
obligation he guarantees : he negotiated it and derives a benefit 
(his commission) from it. Thus, in spite of the fact that his 
Trem Rep. 112 (per Lord Mansfield). 
4 M & S 566 (p_er Lord Ellenborough) . 





Grove v. Dubois (1786) 1 
Morris v. Cleasby (1816) 
Thomas Gabriel & Sons v. liability is secondary, the obligation is regarded as a form of 
indemnity (1). The importance of this is that the requirement 
(laid down in the Statute of Frauds) that a contract of guarantee 
(suretyship) must be in writing does not apply (2). The existence 
of a del credere agency can be proved without writing : it can in 
fact be implied from the conduct of the parties (3) . 
NOTE : See further : G.H.L. Fridman, The Law of Agency (3rd ed. 
1971) pp. 29-30. 
Guarantee of a Bill of Exchange 
or a Promissory Note 
37. This topic was excluded from the Max-Planck-Institut Report in view 
of the fact that the law of the original Six Member States is 
virtually uniform by virtue of the League of Nations Conventions of 
1930 and 1931 (signed in Geneva). The U.K. is not, however, a 
party to these conventions (nor is Ireland) and the aval is not 
recognised to the same extent in the U.K. and Ireland
-^ Thus it has 
been held in England that an aval given on behalf of the acceptor 
is not effective (4) . The endorsement by a stranger to the bill 
does have the effect of an aval as regards those who held the bill 
subsequently (i.e. after the endorsement) but the signer incurs no 
liability to those who were parties before him. 
38. This is, however, a complex topic and it would probably be 
undesirable to attempt to harmonise the law on this matter except 
in the context of the harmonisation of the law of negotiable 
instruments in general. It will therefore be excluded from this 
Report. 
The "P o r t e - F o r t" 
39. The porte-fort is described in the Max-Planck-Institut Report as it 
applies in the law of France and certain other countries following 
the French tradition. (This term is incorrectly translated in the 
English version of the Max-Planck-Institute Report as "bailment"(5), 
There is no equivalent in English law, though the same result could 
probably be obtained by express agreement. 
(1) See above, para. 7. 
(2) Couturier v. Hastie (1852) 8 Exch. 40 (reversed on other grounds 
(1856) 5 H.L. Cas. (673); Wickham v. Wickham (1855) 2 K & J 478; 
Fleet v. Murtón (1871) L.R. 7 Q.B. 126 at 132-3 (per Blackburn J.) 
Sutton & Co. v. Grey (1893) 69 L.T. 354 at 355 (p_er Bowen L.J.) 
(affirmed (1894) 1 Q.B. 285). 
(3) Shaw v. Woodcock (1827) 7 B & C 73. 
(4) Jackson v. Hudson (1810) 2 Camp. 477 at 478 (approved in Steele v. 
McKinlay (1880) 5 App. Cas. 754 at 772). 
(5) For the meaning of the term "bailment" see my Report on Property, 
pp. 54-5 (Chap. 5). 
1 1 40. English law does deal with the situation where one person pretends 
to have the authority to contract on behalf of a "principal" when 
in fact he has no such authority. If the "agent" enters into a 
contract with a third person on behalf of the "principal" the 
position is as follows : if the "principal" ratifies the contract, 
the "agent" incurs no liability; otherwise there is no contract 
with the "principal" but the "agent" is obliged to compensate the 
third party for a breach of warranty of authority. (This is an 
implied warranty that he had the authority of the "principal" to 
contract). The agent is liable even if he acted in good faith and 
without negligence, but such liability can exist only if the third 
party was in fact deceived : if he knew that the "agent" had no 
authority, the latter is not obliged to compensate him. It seems, 
from the description in the Max-Planck-Institute Report that the 
"porte-fort" is different from the warranty of authority in this 
respect. 
NOTE : For a discussion of the warranty of authority see G.H.L. 
Fridman, The Law of Agency (3rd ed. 1971), pp. 179-83. 
The "Credit Order" 
42 
41. There is no precise equivalent in English law to the "credit order" 
of German and Italian law described in para. 19 of the Max-Planck-
Institut Report. It should, however, be noted that in English law 
a principal is obliged to indemnify his agent for any loss suffered 
by the latter as a result of action taken by him within the scope 
of his duties as an agent. This obligation arises automatically 
by operation of law unless the parties agreed to the contrary. It 
is possible, therefore, that this doctrine of the law of agency 
would produce the same result as the provisions of German and 
Italian law discussed in the Max-Planck-Institut Report (1). 
There is another institution of English law that should be 
mentioned although it seems quite different from the "credit order". 
This is the commercial letter of credit. Say A in London wishes to 
buy goods from B in Hamburg. A may agree to open a credit with a 
bank in Hamburg for the price of the goods. A will then arrange 
with his bank in London to arrange with a bank in Hamburg to give B 
a letter of credit for the sum in question. This means that the 
Hamburg bank agrees to accept a bill drawn by B for the sum in 
question in exchange for documents giving title to the goods. A is 
of course obliged to reimburse the bank. I assume that letters of 
credit are also recognised in other Community countries. Since 
they are, however, quite different from guarantees they need not be 
considered further. 
(1) D : art. 778 BGB; I : art. 1958, para. 1 cod. civ. For a 
discussion of the principal's duty to indemnify the agent in 
English law see G.H.L. Fridman, The Law of Agency (3rd ed. 1971), 
pp. 148-9. 
12 Guarantee Insurance 
43. There are various kinds of guarantee insurance, e.g. a fidelity 
bond (insurance against the dishonesty of an employee), insurance 
for the due completion of a contract and debt insurance. The 
economic function of all these kinds of insurance is similar to 
that of a suretyship : to ensure that the person insured does not 
suffer loss if some other person does not carry out his contract. 
44. Legally, however, suretyship and insurance are two quite different 
things. A contract of suretyship is a collateral obligation in 
which the surety's liability is only secondary; an insurance 
contract creates an independant obligation in which the insurer's 
obligation is primary. Other differences include the following : 
1. In the case of suretyship there is only one debt and if the 
surety pays, the debt is discharged. In the case of insurance 
there are two obligations (though that of the insurer only arises 
if the debtor fails to pay) and payment by the insurer does not 
discharge the debt. 
2. If the surety pays the debt he has a direct right against the 
debtor; if the insurer pays, he is only subrogated to the rights of 
the insured against the debtor. 
3. A contract of suretyship must be in writing (Statute of Frauds); 
a contract of insurance may be oral. 
4. A contract of insurance is a contract of utmost good faith 
(uberrimae fidei) ; it is generally considered that a contract of 
suretyship is not (1). 
5. In the case of suretyship the surety is not liable if the 
contract creating the original debt is invalid; but the insurer 
must normally indemnify the insured for the loss he suffers even if 
the debtor is not liable. 
45. It is not always easy in practice to tell whether a particular 
contract is one of suretyship or insurance. The intention of the 
parties is the vital thing. Another factor which may be important 
is that insurance is normally undertaken for commercial motives 
while suretyship is often based on personal friendship between the 
surety and the debtor. However, this is not always true and there 
is nothing to prevent a person entering into a contract of 
suretyship for purely commercial reasons. 
46. The distinction between insurance and indemnity has already been 
considered (2). 
NOTE : See further : Sidney Preston & Raoul Colinvaux, The Law of 
Insurance (2nd ed. 1961), pp. 358-366; Halsbury's Laws of 
England, vol. 22, Insurance, pp. 401-2; 
Charlesworth, pp. 262-4 ; Rowlatt, pp. 9-11. 
(1) Hals., pp. 415 and 495; Charlesworth, pp. 263-4; Rowlatt, p. 10 
(but see Preston & Colinvaux (cited above), p. 359). 
(2) See above, para. 14. 
15 Chapter 5 
FORMATION (CONDITIONS FOR VALIDITY) 
47. Suretyships and indemnities are, of course, governed by the general 
law of contract and the normal rules concerning offer and 
acceptance apply. Capacity to furnish a personal security is also 
governed by the general law of contract. It is not necessary to 
consider all these rules here : all that need be done in this 
chapter is to discuss those rules that are peculiar to personal 
securities, or are particularly important, or are likely to be 
unfamiliar to lawyers from other Member States. 
Capacity 
48. Under English law a minor lacks capacity to enter into a contract 
of suretyship and a purported contract of suretyship entered into 
by a minor cannot be ratified by him when he comes of age (1). If 
a person who has recently come of age agrees to act as surety for 
his parents (or someone who stands in loco parentis towards him) 
there is a presumption (which may be rebutted) that undue influence 
exists. The effect of this is to make the contract voidable (2). 
49. Scotland - In Scottish law a minor can undertake a cautionary 
obligation if he acts with his curators but it will be enforceable 
against him only in certain circumstances (3). 
50. A woman has full capacity to act as a surety, either for her 
husband or for anyone else. There is no presumption of undue 
influence if a wife agrees to stand surety for her husband. 
51 . In the past the position under British law was that if a company 
entered into a contract (e.g. of suretyship) which was outside its 
powers as laid down in its memorandum of association, the contract 
was void (ultra vires doctrine). This, however, has now been 
altered by the Directive of 9.3.1968 on Company Law. 
Consideration 
52. The doctrine of consideration is peculiar to English law and the 
systems derived from it. It is found in England and both parts of 
Ireland but not in Scotland. It is a general doctrine of the law of 
contract and applies to guarantees as well as to other kinds of 
contract. It will first be considered in general terms and then it 
will be shown how it applies to contracts of guarantee. 
(1) See the Infants Relief Act 1874, ss. 1 and 2. (This also applies in 
Ireland). 
(2) See Holden, p. 245. 
(3) See Gow, p. 309. 53. The general rule is that a contract is not enforceable by action 
unless there is consideration. The only exception is a contract by 
deed. A deed is a document that is signed, sealed and delivered by 
the person bound. This requirement is therefore, more than a mere 
requirement of writing since a document that is not, for example, 
sealed by the person bound is not a deed (1). 
54. The general principle of English law is that a promise as such is 
not enforceable (except in the case of a deed) but a bargain is 
enforceable. For a bargain to exist there must be consideration on 
each side. Thus if my promise to pay £100 is to be enforceable 
against me, there must be something on your part in return. This 
is the consideration for my promise. Consideration may consist of 
either a promise on your part (executory consideration) or an act 
or forbearance on your part (executed consideration). Thus if I 
promise to pay you £100 in return for your promising to paint my 
house, there is a bargain : my promise is matched by your promise. 
You can enforce my promise because of the (executory) consideration 
given for it. If I promise to pay you £100 in return for your 
painting my house (not promising to paint it) the consideration is 
not a promise but an act (executed consideration) and my promise is 
enforceable only when the act is done. I might equally promise to 
pay you £100 if you do not do something (e.g. if you do not enforce 
a claim you have against a third person). This too is executed 
consideration. The act must, of course, be something done at the 
request (express or implied) of the promisor. 
55. The consideration must be of some value but it need not be in any 
way equivalent in value to the oromise that is being enforced. 
There is no doctrine of laesio enormis (lesion) in English law. 
The law is concerned only with whether there was a bargain, not 
whether it was a fair bargain. It should also be emphasised that 
the consideration need not benefit the party making the promise. 
If I agree to pay you £100 in return for something which benefits a 
third party, that is consideration for my promise. 
56. A promise to do something which you are already under a general 
legal obligation to do is not, however, consideration. Nor is it 
consideration if you promise me to do something which you have 
already contracted with me to do. Say you owe me £100. If I say 
that I will accept £90 in full settlement and you pay me the £90, I 
can still sue you for the other £10. This is because there is no 
consideration for my promise to forgo the remaining £10 : you were 
already under an obligation to pay me the £90. If, however, you 
agree to paint my house or give me something in exchange for 
accepting £90 in final settlement, there is consideration. Likewise 
if you owe me £100 payable next week, and you offer to give me £90 
payable now, then there is consideration because I am getting money 
now when you were obliged to pay me only by next week. 
(1) It should be mentioned that a seal need not be of wax and today a 
circular red wafer can be glued to the paper. 
15 57. Two exceptions to what has been said should be mentioned. First, 
if a debtor agrees with all his creditors that he will pay each one 
of them so much in the pound and they accept, (composition 
agreement) this is binding though there is no consideration. 
Secondly, if you owe me £100 and I agree with a third person to 
accept £90 from him in full satisfaction of the debt, then I am 
also bound and cannot claim the remaining £10 from you. These two 
exceptions are anormalous but there are obvious practical reasons 
for them. 
58. It should also be mentioned that past consideration is not good 
consideration. Thus if I promise to give you £100 in return for 
your having painted my house, my promise is not enforceable because 
the act had already taken place before my promise was made. 
59. These are the general principles of consideration. They apply to 
contracts of guarantee just as much as to other kinds of contract. 
If the suretyship agreement is in a deed, no problems of 
consideration arise; otherwise the creditor must give consideration 
to the surety in return for his obligation to guarantee the debt. 
Frequently the consideration will be the granting of credit to the 
principal debtor. Thus the surety may agree with the creditor that 
if the latter grants credit to the principal debtor, he will stand 
surety for the debt. Since past consideration is no good, however, 
the agreement with the surety must precede the granting of credit. 
Here the surety is guaranteeing future debts. It is also possible 
that the creditor will demand that, in return for granting future 
credit to the principal debtor, the surety must guarantee both past 
and future debts. This agreement is fully enforceable. 
6Ό. Another possibility is that the creditor will agree not to take 
legal proceedings during a certain period of time to recover a debt 
already due in return for the surety agreeing to guarantee the debt. 
This is also good consideration. If, however, the surety agrees to 
guarantee a debt without obtaining any consideration in return, his 
promise is unenforceable. It should be emphasised again that it is 
not necessary for the surety to obtain any personal benefit from 
the arrangement : it is enough if the creditor agrees to something 
that benefits the principal debtor. The consideration must, 
however, come from the creditor : if the principal debtor agrees to 
pay the surety in return for his undertaking the suretyship, there 
is no obligation towards the creditor which the latter can enforce. 
61. The distinction between executed and executory consideration is 
important in the case of suretyship. If S agrees to become a 
surety in return for C's promising to grant credit up to a certain 
sum to D, there is executory consideration and the agreement is 
binding immediatly. But if S agrees that he will be surety if C 
gives credit to D, this is a case of executed consideration. C 
does not promise that he will give credit and until he actually 
does give the credit there is no consideration and S is not bound. 
The point is more important where S agrees to guarantee both past 
and future debts in consideration of the granting of further credit. 
Here S's promise is not enforceable unless and until further credit 
is actually granted. If further credit is never granted (possibly 
because D decides he does not want it) S will not be liable for the 
past debts . 
16 62. Finally it should be mentioned that under section 3 of the 
Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1856 it is not necessary for the 
consideration to be mentioned in the written document constituting 
the agreement of suretyship. 
NOTE : See further : Rowlatt, chap. 2; Halsbury, pp. 419-23. 
63. Scotland - The doctrine of consideration does not apply to Scotland. 
Writing 
64. Contracts of suretyship must be in writing. This is laid down by 
section 4 of the Statute of Frauds 1677. This provides : 
"No action shall be brought to charge the defendant upon 
any special promise to answer for the debt, default, or 
miscarriage of another person ... unless the agreement 
upon which such action shall be brought, or some 
memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing and signed 
by the party to be charged therewith or some other person 
thereunto by him lawfully authorised." 
This statute, which originally applied to other kinds of contract 
besides a contract of suretyship (1), was an important modification 
of the English common law, which did not require any kind of 
contract to be in writing (except contracts by deed) . 
65. This provision covers all contracts of guarantee (suretyship) ; it 
also covers certain contracts that would not normally be regarded 
as guarantees. The word "miscarriage" in the Statute could apply 
to a tort (delict) as well as a breach of contract and consequently 
an agreement to be answerable for loss caused by the tortious act 
of another would also come within the Statute. But if we put this 
case on one side, it can be said that if the contract is not one of 
guarantee, it does not come within the Statute. Thus a joint debt 
does not come within the Statute; nor does a contract of insurance. 
A contract of indemnity is also outside the scope of the Statute. 
In fact in any case in which the liability of the person bound is 
primary and not secondary the Statute will not apply. Moreover, if 
a guarantee is an incident in a wider transaction or is given to 
protect a proprietary interest of the guarantor, it also does not 
come within the Statute. For this reason the promise of a del 
credere agent to be responsible to the principal for the price of 
the goods sold does not need to be in writing (2). The main object 
of the contract between the del credere agent and his principal is 
to settle the terms on which the agent will be employed and the 
purpose of the guarantee provision, is to ensure that the agent will 
exercise greater care in choosing the persons to whom he sells the 
principal's goods. 
(1) The Statute of Frauds also applied to contracts for the sale of land 
and this provision was re-enacted by s.40 of the Law of Property Act 
1925 and is still applicable. The provisions of the Statute that 
required certain other kinds of contract to be in writing were 
repealed by the Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act 1954. 
(2) See above, para. 36. 
17 66. It is important to note that the effect of the Statute is not to 
make an oral contract void but merely to make it unenforceable. It 
is therefore an evidentiary, not a formal, requirement; this has 
important consequences in private international law (1). Another 
consequence of the evidentiary nature of the Statute is that if 
money is paid under an oral guarantee it cannot be recovered (2). 
67. To comply with the Statute the document must identify the parties 
and state the terms of the agreement. It need only be signed by 
the party against whom it is being enforced but the other party 
must be named or otherwise identified. The doctrine of 
consideration applies to a written contract as much as to any other 
(except a contract by deed) but the document need not state what 
the consideration is. This can be proved by oral evidence. This 
rule is the result of section 3 of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act 
1856. A written note to the creditor, signed by the surety, 
offering to guarantee a particular debt is sufficient. It does not 
matter that it is in the form of an offer, provided the offer was 
subsequently accepted by the creditor. Nor does it matter if the 
note was written after the contract was entered into. The Statute 
will, therefore, be comnlied with if the surety writes a letter to 
the creditor, after the guarantee is entered into, and mentions in 
the letter the terms that were agreed upon. Terms that are implied 
by law or are customary need not be stated. 
68. It has already been said that a contract of indemnity is outside 
the scope of the Statute (because the indemnifier undertakes 
primary, not secondary liability). This is, cf course, anomalous : 
the purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to protect the surety and, 
since the indemnifier undertakes even greater liability than the 
surety, it would be logical if he too benefited from the protection. 
There is, however, one special case in which he does. This is if 
the principal contract is one of hire-purchase, conditional sale or 
credit-sale which comes within the Hire-Purchase Act 1965. This 
Act has various provisions to protect someone who acts as a surety 
for the hirer/buyer and these provisions apply to an indemnifier as 
well. (See the definition of a "contract of guarantee" in section 
58(1). Section 22(1)(b) of the Act contains a requirement of 
writing similar to that of the Statute of Frauds and this 
consequently applies to indemnities as well if they come within the 
scope of the Act. The provisions of the Act are considered in more 
detail below (3). 
NOTE : See further, Sutton & Shannon on Contracts (7th ed. 1970) 
Ch. 10; Rowlatt, Ch.3. 
69  Ireland - The Statute of Frauds 1677 does not apply in Ireland. 
However, identical provisions apply in both parts of Ireland by 
virtue of the Statute of Frauds (Ireland) 1695, section 2 (4). 
(1) See below, para. 122. 
(2) See Rowlatt, p. 30 and cases cited at note (g). In the case of a 
contract for the sale of land (to which the statute also applies) 
there is a rule that writing is not necessary if there has been 
part performance. But this rule probably does not apply to 
contracts of guarantee; see Maddison v. Alderson (1833) 8 App. Cas 
467 at 474 (H.L.). See further, Sutton & Shannon on Contracts 
(7th ed. 1970), p. 254. 
(3) See below, paras. 77-84. 
(4) This is a statute of the Irish Parliament. 
18 The Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1856 applies in both Northern 
Ireland and the Republic. 
The Hire-Purchase Act 1965 does not apply in Ireland. Similar 
provisions apply in Northern Ireland by virtue of the Hire-Purchase 
Act 1966 (N.Ì.). The position in the Republic is slightly 
different : see the Hire-Purchase Acts 1946 and 1960 (Irish 
Republic). 
70. Scotland - The Statute of Frauds does not apply to Scotland but 
similar provisions were laid down by section 6 of the Mercantile 
Law Amendment (Scotland) Act 1856. This reads : 
"... all guarantees, securities or cautionary obligations 
made or granted by any person for any other person... 
shall be in writing, and shall be subscribed by the person 
undertaking such guarantee, security or cautionary 
obligation... or by some person duly authorised by him... 
otherwise the same shall have no affect." 
The exact meaning of this is controversial and Scottish writers do 
not all take the same approach to it (1). However, it is probable 
that in general it means the same as the English Statute of Frauds; 
but there may be differences of detail. The Hire-Purchase Act 1965 
does not apply in Scotland but similar provisions are found in the 
Hire-Purchase (Scotland) Act 1965. 
Fraud, Misrepresentation 
and Non-disclosure 
71. Like any other contract, a contract of suretyship is voidable on 
the ground of fraud or misrepresentation. In the case of 
suretyship, however, it is necessary that the creditor (not the 
principal debtor) either was a party to the fraud or 
misrepresentation or had knowledge of it. If either of these 
conditions is fulfilled the surety can avoid the contract 
notwithstanding the fact that the creditor entered into a 
transaction in reliance on the suretyship (2). 
72. In the past there were some doubts whether or not mere non-
disclosure made a contract of suretyship voidable, i.e. whether 
suretyship was a contract uberrimae fidei. It now seems settled 
that it is not (3) but the courts often seem willing to regard a 
(1) Compare Gow, pp. 304-7 with Gloag & Henderson, p. 221. 
(2) See Mackenzie v. Royal Bank of Canada (1934) A.C. 468; Spencer v. 
Handley (184 2) 4 M & G 414. As to misrepresentation, see the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967. 
(3) Hamilton v. Watson (1845) 12 CI. & F. 109; North British Insurance 
Co. v. Lloyd (1854) 10 Exch. 5 23; Railton v. Matthews (1844) 10 CI. 
I~F. 934; London General Omnibus Co. v. Holloway (1912) 2 K.B. 72. 
See also Seaton v. Heath (1899) 1 Q.B. 782, 793, reversed (1900)A.C, 
135 without affecting this point; and Workington Harbour, etc. v. 
Trade Indemnity Co. 49 L1.L.R. 430; reversed sub.nom. Trade 
Indemnity Co. v. Workington Harbour, etc. (1937) A.C.I. 
19 partial disclosure as tantamount to misrepresentation and if the 
surety is given to understand that there are no unusual risks 
involved the contract could be voidable for misrepresentation if it 
turns out that this is not the case. The courts appear to take an 
especially strict view in the case of a fidelity guarantee 
(guarantee for the good conduct of an employee) and in one case it 
was held that the surety was not liable since the employer had 
failed to disclose previous misconduct on the part of the employee 
(Ό-
Revocation 
73. in considering the question of when the contract becomes binding 
and whether the surety can revoke his promise, it is again 
necessary to distinguish between executory and executed 
consideration. In the case of executory consideration the creditor 
makes a promise in return for the surety's promise and the contract 
is binding as soon as agreement is reached. This is a bilateral 
contract : there are obligations on both sides. In the case of 
executed consideration, however, the surety asks the creditor to do 
something and promises that if he does, the surety will undertake 
his obligations. Here the creditor does not himself promise 
anything; he is merely informed that if he does something (e.g. 
grants further credit) the surety will undertake certain 
obligations. In this situation there is no binding contract until 
the creditor does what he is asked; there is merely an offer by the 
surety which the creditor can accept by doing what he has been 
asked. Until this happens the surety can withdraw his offer by 
informing the creditor. The offer is always revocable at this 
stage because there is no consideration until the creditor has 
acted. 
74. What has been said in the previous paragraph is concerned with the 
formation of the contract : the time at which it becomes binding. 
The problem whether a continuing guarantee can be revoked after it 
has been in operation for a certain length of time raises different 
questions. A continuing guarantee is one in which the surety 
promises to guarantee any debts that may exist from time to time as 
regards a particular debtor. The problem here is to decide whether 
the guarantee is one transaction or a series of transactions. The 
nature of the consideration could be relevant here : if the 
consideration is the granting of credit to the debtor it could be 
that the parties intended that the granting of each advance to the 
debtor would be consideration merely for the guaranteeing of that 
advance. In this case there is not in fact a continuing contract 
but a continuing offer by the surety to guarantee each advance as 
it occurs. This offer is accepted by the granting of the advance. 
Clearly, if this is the case the surety can at any time withdraw 
his offer as regards future advances (i.e. those which have not yet 
been made). 
(1) London General Omnibus Co. v. Holloway (1912) 2 K.B. 72. 75. The whole matter, of course, depends on the intention of the 
parties. In construing their intention in doubtful cases, however, 
the courts may also consider whether the creditor has entered into 
an irrevocable transaction in reliance on the suretyship. If the 
creditor's obligations can be terminated, it would not prejudice 
him if the surety were also able to terminate his obligations (on 
reasonable notice) since, in this case, the creditor could protect 
himself by terminating his transaction as well. An example might 
make this clearer : a fidelity guarantee is a form of suretyship in 
which the surety guarantees to an employer the honesty and good 
behaviour of an employee. If the contract of employment is 
terminable at, say, a month's notice, it would not be unreasonable 
to construe the suretyship agreement (if it does not expressly deal 
with the matter) as giving the surety the right to terminate his 
obligations on a similar period of notice. The employer can then 
protect himself by dismissing the employee. (It is assumed that the 
consideration in this case was the appointment of the employee). 
76. The death or insanity of the surety will revoke the guarantee 
provided the creditor is informed and the guarantee is revocable 
under the principles just discussed. 
Hire-Purchase and Consumer Credit 
77. In recent times the British Parliament has pursued a policy of 
giving special protection to consumers who purchase goods on 
credit. Various statutes have been passed to give effect to this 
policy, the current ones in England being the Hire-Purchase Acts of 
1964 and 1965. The main principles of these Acts were discussed in 
my previous Report (1). The 1965 Act also contains provisions 
relating to contracts of guarantee or indemnity where these 
contracts are entered into in relation to a hire-purchase 
agreement, conditional sale agreement or credit sale agreement 
which is itself within the scope of the Act. At the end of 1973, 
however, a bill (called the Consumer Credit Bill) was introduced 
into the U.K. Parliament with the object of reforming the law in 
this area so as to strengthen the position of the consumer still 
further. The Consumer Credit Bill has not yet (2) become law but 
will probably do so in the course of 1974. When it comes into 
operation it will apply to the whole of the U.K. (England, Scotland 
and Northern Ireland) and the present legislation will be repealed. 
In view of this the present law in England will be considered 
briefly (the law in Scotland and Northern Ireland is similar) and 
then the main provisions of the Bill will be discussed in so far as 
they relate to guarantees and indemnities. The discussion of the 
new law must, however, be fairly tentative since it is possible 
that the Bill will be amended by the Legislature. Please note also 
that changes in the Bill may mean that the references given in this 
Report to specific clauses may no longer be correct (3). 
(1) See my Report on Property, pp. 95-99a. 
(2) February 1974. 
(3) The references given below are to the Bill in the form in which it 
was after it had been amended by Standing Committee D of the House 
of Commons (5 February 1974). 
21 78. The Hire-Purchase Act 1965 - Section 58 (1) of this Act contains a 
definition of a contract of guarantee for the purposes of the Act 
which provides that a contract of guarantee, in relation to a 
hire-purchase, conditional sale, or credit sale agreement, means : 
"a contract, made at the request (express or implied) of 
the hirer or buyer, either to guarantee the performance of 
the hirer's or buyer's obligation under the hire-
purchase agreement, credit sale agreement or conditional 
sale agreement, or to indemnify the owner or seller 
against any loss which he may incur in respect of that 
agreement, and "guarantor" shall be construed accordingly." 
As a result of this the term "guarantee" when used in the Act 
includes an indemnity. 
79. The main provisions of the Act concerning "contracts of guarantee" 
so defined are : 
1. The contract must be evidenced by a note or memorandum in 
writing signed by the guarantor (or another person 
authorised by him) (1). Such a requirement already 
existed as regards contracts of suretyship under the 
Statute of Frauds; the effect of the 1965 Act is to extend 
it to contracts of indemnity within its scope. 
2. Seven days after the making of the contract of guarantee 
or the hire-purchase agreement (whichever is the later) 
the guarantor must be given a copy of the hire-purchase 
agreement and of the note or memorandum evidencing the 
contract of guarantee. These copies must comply with 
certain provisions concerning legibility laid down by 
Regulations made under the Act. Failure to comply with 
these requirements makes the guarantee unenforceable 
unless a court decides that the guarantor was not 
prejudiced by such failure (2). There are certain other 
documents copies of which must be given to the guarantor 
upon request (3) . 
3. If the hirer exercises his statutory right to cancel the 
hire-purchase contract, an associated contract of guarantee 
(or indemnity) is deemed never to have had any effect (4). 
4. Various other provisions giving protection to the consumer 
also extend to the guarantor; in particular if the owner 
recovers the goods unlawfully (i.e. contrary to section 34 
(1)), the guarantor has the right to recover from the owner 
all sums paid by him under the guarantee (5). It is also 
provided that if the owner takes legal proceedings under 
the Act to recover the goods, the guarantor must be made a 
party to the proceedings (6). 
(1) S.22 (1)(b). 
(2) S.22 (1) ,(2) and (3) . 
(3) S.23. 
(4) S.14 -(1). 
(5) S.34 (2). 
(6) S.35 (2). 
22 80. One problem raised by this Act, however, is that it is not 
expressly stated that the liability of the guarantor cannot be 
greater than that of the hirer. This is important because there 
are limits to the maximum liability of the hirer. Under the 
common law principle of the accessory character of suretyship, a 
guarantor in the normal common law sense would probably be 
protected; but an indemnifier (included under the statutory 
definition of "guarantor") would not be. If the owner were to 
recover more from the indemnifier than he could from the hirer, 
could the indemnifier claim reimbursement from the hirer? The 
answer is not entirely clear but if this could be done the 
statutory protection of the hirer might be undermined. 
NOTE : See further on this topic Goode, pp. 504-8. 
80a. Scotland - The Hire-Purchase Act 1965 does not apply in Scotland 
but similar provisions are found in the Hire-Purchase (Scotland) 
Act 1965. 
80b. Northern Ireland - The Hire-Purchase Act 1965 does not apply in 
Northern Ireland but similar provisions are found in the Hire-
Purchase Act 1966 (a statute of the Northern Ireland Parliament). 
80c. Republic of Ireland - The law in the Republic is slightly 
different i see the Hire-Purchase Acts 1946 and 1960 (Republic of 
Ireland). 
81. The Consumer Credit Bill - The scope of the Bill is wider than the 
previous legislation. The agreements covered by it are defined in 
some detail (1) but in general terms one can say that, subject to 
certain exceptions, all consumer credit transactions up to £5000 
in which the debtor is not a corporation (including hire-purchase, 
credit sale and conditional sale) are covered by the Act. This 
applies both where the credit is granted to finance a particular 
transaction and where the debtor is free to use the credit as he 
pleases . 
82. The Bill provides that a security agreement must be in writing and 
it also makes provision for Regulations to provide for the form 
and content of the instrument creating it (2). The instrument 
must be signed by the surety personally (3). A copy must be 
delivered to him within seven days of its being made and there is 
a like provision for delivery of a copy of the principal agreement 
(4). Failure to comply with any of these provisions makes the 
agreement unenforceable unless a court order is obtained (5). The 
surety is also entitled to obtain certain documents on request (6). 
(1) See clauses 8-19. 
(2) CI. 100 A "security" includes both a suretyship and an indemnity 
see clause 171(1). 
(3) CI. 100 (4)(d). 
(4) CI. 100 (4) (b) and (c) . 
(5) CI. 100 (5). 
(6) Clauses 103-5. 
23 83. Clause 108(1) of the Bill expressly states that the creditor or 
owner cannot by enforcing a security obtain a greater benefit than 
he would get if the principal transaction were carried out by the 
debtor/hirer to the extent that would be enforceable under the Act. 
This applies to both a suretyship agreement and an indemnity. 
There is, however, one exception : clause 108(6) states that an 
indemnity given in a case where the debtor/hirer is a minor is to 
be enforced to the extent that it would be if the minor were of 
full capacity. This preserves the common law rule (1). 
84. Republic of Ireland - The Consumer Credit Bill does not, of course, 
apply to the Republic. 
(1) See para. 19. 
24 Chapter 4 
EXTENT AND EXTINCTION OF GUARANTOR'S LIABILITY 
Non-Subsidiary Character 
85. The surety is liable as soon as the debtor makes default (but not 
before) . Unless there is provision to the contrary in the contract 
of suretyship, the creditor is not obliged to take proceedings 
against the debtor before claiming from the surety. 
86. Scotland - In the past the position was different in Scotland. 
There the subsidiary character of a cautionary obligation 
(suretyship) was recognised (provided it was constituted in the 
proper form) and the creditor was obliged to take proceedings 
against the debtor before he could claim against the surety. (This 
was known as the "benefit of discussion" or "beneficium qrdinis"). 
This was altered by section 8 of the Mercantile Law Amendment 
(Scotland) Act 1856 and the position is now the same as in 
England (1) . 
Accessory Character 
87. This has already been considered in Chapter 1(2). This applies to 
a suretyship and to a del credere agent but not to an indemnity. 
It is open to the parties to agree expressly that the "surety's" 
obligations will be greater than those of the debtor but if this is 
done the contract will be one of indemnity, not suretyship. 
Discharge of the Surety 
88. There are various grounds on which the surety may be discharged. 
Many of them follow from, or are extensions of, the principle of 
the accessory nature of suretyship; others are based on the idea 
that the creditor should not be allowed to take action that 
unfairly prejudices the position of the surety. An indemnifier is 
in a less strong position and the question whether he will be 
discharged often depends on the exact terms of the contract. 
89. The first general principle is that the surety will be discharged 
if the debtor is discharged : this follows from the accessory 
nature of suretyship. Obviously if the debtor performs his 
obligations, the surety is discharged; partial performance by the 
debtor will discharge the surety pro tanto. The extent to which 
these rules apply to an indemnity will depend on its terms. 
(1) It is possible, however, that section 8 of the Act of 1856 applies 
only where the caution is to guarantee a money debt. If the 
debtor's obligation is to perform an act it is possible that the 
old rule will still apply. 
(2) See paras. 16 - 22. 
25 90. If the creditor discharges the debtor by a binding legal agreement, 
this will also have the effect of discharging the surety unless the 
original contract of suretyship provided the contrary. The same 
applies where the creditor agrees to a novation (i.e. where a new 
obligation is substituted for the obligation undertaken by the 
debtor in the original agreement). The reason for this rule is 
that the surety would otherwise be prejudiced by losing his right 
to claim an indemnity from the debtor. It is not clear whether the 
same rule applies to an indemnity; it is probable that it does 
unless the contrary is stated in the contract. 
91. Under section 28(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1914 it is provided that 
an order of discharge will not release a person who was a surety or 
was "in the nature of a surety" for the bankrupt. Section 16(20) 
also provides that the same applies to compositions and schemes of 
arrangement entered into after the making of the receiving order. 
92. If the creditor is guilty of a breach of contract against the 
debtor of such a nature that the debtor is discharged from his 
obligations under the contract, the surety will also be discharged. 
Likewise, the creditor cannot sue the surety if he is unable to sue 
the debtor because he (the creditor) has failed to carry out his 
part of the contract. If there is a breach of contract by the 
creditor which does not discharge the debtor but gives him a right 
to counterclaim for damages, the surety can also avail himself of 
this right by way of set-off if sued by the creditor; in fact the 
surety can avail himself of any defence that the debtor might have 
had which absolves him, partially or wholly, from the claims of the 
creditor. The extent to which these defences could apply to an 
indemnifier depends on the terms of the contract of indemnity. 
93. The second general principle is that the surety will be discharged 
if the contract between the creditor and the debtor is varied. 
This is because a variation in the principal obligation will change 
the nature of the risk assumed by the surety. This rule only 
applies, however, if the variation could prejudice the surety : if 
there is no possibility of prejudice, there is obviously no reason 
why he should be discharged. This rule is, however, applied 
strictly : if there is any possibility of prejudice the surety will 
be discharged - even if in fact no prejudice occurs or if the 
variation in the contract is very slight. The surety will not, of 
course, be discharged if the contract of suretyship provided for 
such a variation. 
94. A binding agreement by the creditor to give more time to the debtor 
will also discharge the surety : this is in fact an example of 
variation of the principal contract. (The surety is not discharged 
if the creditor in fact allows the debtor time to pay without 
entering into a legally enforceable obligation to do so). The 
argument for this rule is rather technical : it is said that the 
surety might wish to pay off the creditor as soon as the debt is 
due and then bring an action against the debtor. If the debtor is 
given an extension of time the surety would not be able to claim an 
indemnity from him until the new time limit has expired. It is not 
very likely in practice, however, that the surety would wish to do 
this; nevertheless the rule seems firmly established. 
26 95. The creditor can protect his position in two ways : first, he can 
insert a clause into the original suretyship agreement allowing him 
to grant additional time; secondly, he can reserve his rights 
against the surety by informing the debtor, at the time when he 
grants additional time, that the position of the surety will not be 
affected (1). In either case the surety will not be discharged if 
additional time is granted. It should be noted that in the second 
case the consent of the surety is not required; however, if any 
variation is made to the principal agreement other than the 
granting of additional time, the consent of the surety must be 
obtained. 
96. A third general principle is that the surety may be released if the 
creditor is guilty of conduct that prejudices the rights of the 
surety. It is, however, not always clear whether the surety will 
be completely discharged or whether he will be discharged only to 
the extent that he has in fact been prejudiced. 
97. The first case is the release of a co-surety. This prejudices the 
rights of the remaining surety because he loses the right to obtain 
a contribution from the co-surety. It seems that if the 
co-sureties are jointly liable (or jointly and severally liable) 
the remaining surety (or sureties) will be totally released (2). 
This may not be so if they are severally liable. 
98. The second case is where the creditor surrenders securities held by 
him. Here the matter seems to depend on whether the security was 
an essential part of the contract of suretyship : if it was, the 
surety will be fully discharged. If, however, it was not an 
essential part of the contract (e.g. if the debtor gave the 
security after the contract of suretyship was entered into) the 
surety will be discharged only to the extent that he was actually 
prejudiced. Again, it is possible for the contract of suretyship 
to give the creditor the right to release securities without 
discharging the surety. 
99. The third case is where the creditor negligently fails to realise 
the value of a security (or fails to realise it to its full extent): 
in this case it seems that the surety is discharged only to the 
extent that he is in fact prejudiced. 
100. Finally, it should be mentioned that the surety may be discharged 
if the creditor is guilty of a breach of the contract of suretyship. 
In this case the normal principles of the law of contract will be 
applied : if the breach goes to the root of the contract, or shows 
an intention to repudiate the contract, the surety will be 
completely discharged; otherwise the surety will be entitled to 
counterclaim for damages if sued by the creditor : this will mean 
in effect that he will be discharged only to the extent that he has 
actually been prejudiced. 
NOTE : See further Chitty, pp. 787-98 and Goode, pp. 494-501. 
(1) In this case the surety retains the right to pay the debt when it 
was originally due and claim an indemnity from the debtor. 
(2) In Scotland this is expressly provided in section 9 of the 
Mercantile Law Amendment (Scotland) Act 1856 which makes an 
exception of the case when the discharged co-surety is bankrupt. 
27 101. Scotland - The position in Scotland is basically the same : see 
Gow, pp. 317-26; Gloag and Henderson, pp. 227-32. 
Prescription (Limitation of Actions) 
102. It is important to distinguish between the prescription of the 
obligation of the surety and the prescription of the principal 
obligation. Once the surety's obligation is prescribed, no action 
can be brought against him. The period of limitation is laid down 
by the Limitation Act 1939, section 2, and is six years from the 
date on which the surety first became liable, i.e. the date on 
which he could first have been sued by the creditor. (This is 
normally when the debtor makes default but the contract of 
suretyship might lay down some condition precedent to his 
liability). 
103. A more difficult problem arises where the principal obligation is 
prescribed but not that of the surety. It is not certain whether 
the surety can be sued in such a case (1). It would seem in 
accord with the accessory nature of suretyship to maintain that 
the surety could not be sued; though under English law 
prescription destroys merely the right of action, not the debt 
itself : the principal debtor is still under an obligation to 
perform but the creditor cannot enforce it. However, if the 
surety remained liable he would then be entitled to claim 
reimbursement from the debtor; the effect of this would be that 
the debtor would be made to pay indirectly. 
104. Scotland - In Scotland there is a statute, the Cautioners Act 1695 
(c.5), which is a statute of the Scottish Parliament (before the 
Union with England). This provides (in part) as follows : 
"... no man binding and engaging for hereafter, for and with 
another conjunctly and severally, in any bond or contract for 
sums of money, shall be bound for the said sums for longer 
than seven years after the date of the bond, but that from 
and after the said seven years, the said cautioner shall be 
eo ipso free of his caution." 
The exact meaning of this provision is not entirely clear but the 
following points should be noted. First, the Act does not apply to 
all cautionary obligations (contracts of suretyship) : it does not 
apply unless the principal obligation is a money debt and the 
cautionary obligation is created by the same instrument as the 
principal obligation. Secondly, the period of seven years starts 
to run from the date when the cautionary obligation is created not, 
as in England, from the date when the creditor can call upon the 
surety to make payment. The Act does not, however, apply if the 
principal obligation is not due within the seven year period (2). 
(1) See Rowlatt, p. 299. 
(2) It may be that the principal obligation must be due throughout the 
seven year period : see Gloag and Henderson, p. 228; compare Gow, 
p. 318. 
28 Thirdly, where the Act is applicable, it completely extinguishes 
the obligation so that if the surety pays in ignorance, he can 
reclaim what he paid. (In English law the Limitation Act merely 
takes away the remedy, it does not extinguish the obligation 
itself). See further : Gow, pp. 317-9; Gloag and Henderson, 
pp. 227-8. 
S e t - 0 f f 
105. The law concerning set-off is not entirely clear. If the debt to 
be set-off arose from the same transaction as that guaranteed, it 
is clear that the surety may benefit from any set-off available to 
the debtor; it is less certain, however, that he can do this if 
the debt arises from a completely different transaction (1). 
Partnerships 
106. If a continuing guarantee is given either to a partnership or to a 
third person in respect of the transactions of a partnership, 
then the guarantee is automatically revoked as to future 
transactions, unless the contrary is stipulated in the contract of 
guarantee, if there is a change in the constitution of the firm in 
question. This is provided in the Partnership Act 1890, section 
18 (2). 
Scotland - There is a similar provision in the Mercantile Law 
Amendment (Scotland) Act 1856, section 7. 
Costs and Interest 
107. The question whether the surety is liable for the costs of legal 
proceedings taken by the creditor against the principal debtor 
or of interest on the debt depends on the terms of the contract of 
suretyship. 
Co-Sureties 
108. The question whether co-sureties are jointly, jointly and 
severally, or only severally liable (and in what proportion they 
are liable) depends on the terms of the contract of suretyship. 
(1) According to Rowlatt (pp.137-41) the surety has no right to set off 
a debt due in a different transaction between the debtor and the 
creditor but if the creditor sues the surety for the whole amount, 
the debtor can demand that the set-off be made. The reason for 
this is that if the surety was obliged to pay the whole amount 
(without the benefit of the set-off), he could then claim 
reimbursement from the debtor. The effect of this would be that 
the debtor would lose the benefit of the set-off. 
(2) Applicable in Ireland but not Scotland. 
29 Chapter 5 
THE SURETY'S CLAIM FOR REPAYMENT 
109. A surety who has paid the debt can claim against the debtor for 
repayment. There are, in fact, two different bases for this 
claim : the surety has a claim for indemnity and he is also 
subrogated to the creditor's rights against the debtor. 
(NOTE : The term "indemnity" is used here in a wider sense (1) than 
normally used in this Report.) 
The Surety's Right of Indemnity 
110. The surety's right of indemnity is based on two possible legal 
foundations : an implied contract with the debtor or the law of 
restitution (quasi-contract). An implied contract can exist only 
if the suretyship was undertaken at the request (express or 
implied) of the debtor. If this is the case, however, the law 
assumes an implied agreement between them that the surety is to 
have right of indemnity against the debtor. Of course, the surety 
and debtor are free to enter into an express contract on this 
point and they may, if they wish, exclude such a right. If there 
is no implied contract between the debtor and the surety, the 
surety can claim a restitutionary remedy against the debtor on the 
ground that he has discharged a debt for which the debtor is 
ultimately liable. 
111. It should be noted that the surety obtains this right to an 
indemnity only when he actually pays the debt; moreover, if he 
pays the debt before it was due, he cannot claim against the 
debtor until the due date. If the creditor sues the surety 
without suing the debtor, the surety can have the debtor made a 
party to the proceedings. The surety cannot obtain an indemnity 
from the debtor if he pays a debt which was not enforceable 
against the debtor (2); but it has been held that he can obtain an 
indemnity if he pays a debt that was not enforceable against him 
(the surety) because the contract of suretyship was not evidenced 
by a note or memorandum in writing as required by the Statute of 
Frauds (3) . 
(1) See above, paras. 10-12. The term used in Scottish law is 
"relief". In Scotland, therefore, one talks of the cautioner's 
right to claim relief. 
(2) See the Irish case of Coneys v. Morris (1922)1 Ir.R.81. However, 
the case of Re Chetwynd's Estate (1938)Ch.13 is contrary to this. 
(3) Alexander v. Vane (185 6)1 M & W 511. This is quite fair since the 
surety's payment relieved the debtor of a debt which was 
enforceable against him (the debtor) . 112. Although the surety has no claim for payment against the debtor 
until he has first paid the creditor, he does have the right (at 
least where the suretyship was entered into at the request of the 
debtor) to bring action against the debtor to require him to pay 
the creditor and thus relieve the surety. This action can, of 
course, be brought only after the surety becomes liable to be sued 
by the creditor, i.e. when the debt is payable by the debtor. 
113. The amount that the surety can claim against the debtor is the 
amount for which the surety was liable to the creditor (i.e. the 
amount for which the debtor was liable, unless the liability of 
the surety was limited to a lesser amount). The surety can 
probably also claim any reasonable costs he incurred in defending 
an action brought by the creditor provided he had a reasonable 
ground on which to defend it (1). It would probably be desirable, 
however, for the surety to have the debtor made a party to any 
proceedings brought by the creditor. 
114. The position where the debtor is bankrupt is as follows. If the 
surety has paid the whole debt, he can claim for it against the 
debtor's estate; if he has not paid anything, he cannot claim at 
all and the creditor can claim for the whole debt (2). If the 
surety has paid only part of the debt, his right to claim depends 
on whether he guaranteed the whole debt (even if his liability was 
limited to a certain sum) or only part. If he guaranteed the 
whole debt and paid only part of it (even if his liability was 
limited to that amount), he cannot claim at all and the creditor 
may claim for the whole debt (3). If, on the other hand, the 
surety guaranteed only part of the debt, he can, once he has paid 
that part, claim against the debtor's estate for that part; the 
creditor can claim only for the unpaid part (4). 
115. Where there is a contract of indemnity, not suretyship, it is not 
entirely clear whether the indemnifier has a right to an indemnity 
from the debtor once he has paid the creditor. It is likely that 
he would have such a right where the contract of indemnity was 
entered into at the request of the debtor and it is probable 
(depending on the terms of the agreement between the indemnifier 
and the debtor) that the indemnifier could recover in full what he 
was obliged to pay even if the debtor was not liable to the same 
extent. There is probably an exception to this, however, where 
the debtor is a minor. If the contract of indemnity is not 
entered into at the request of the debtor, the indemnifier could 
claim only restitutionary rights, or rights based on a subrogation 
of the creditor's rights, and he could not claim more than the 
debtor owed to the creditor. 
(1) See Rowlatt, pp. 195-6. 
(2) If the creditor is not paid in full and obtains the balance of the 
debt from the surety, the latter cannot claim against the estate : 
to allow this would be to allow two claims for the same debt. 
(3) If the creditor recovers more than the amount that remains owing, 
he must account to the surety for the difference. In Scotland, if 
the cautioner paid before the date of sequestration, the creditor 
cannot claim for more than the balance of the debt : Gow, p. 317; 
Gloag and Henderson, pp. 226-7. 
(4) See further Chitty, para. 1678. 
31 Subrogation and Assignment 
116. When the surety pays the creditor he is subrogated to the rights 
of the creditor against the debtor in respect of the debt in 
question. This is a question of equity. It is based on the idea 
that since the creditor has benefited from the payment of the debt 
by the surety it would be inequitable for him to retain or release 
any securities for the debt. This includes any securities held by 
the creditor which are charged with debt, including securities 
given by the debtor to the creditor after the contract of 
suretyship was entered into, even if the surety did not know of 
their existence. It should also be noted that if the creditor 
makes further advances to the debtor (for which the surety is not 
liable) and these further debts are charged to the same security, 
the claim of the surety, once he has paid the original loan, takes 
precedence over that of the creditor for the later advances (1). 
117. In addition to the equitable right already mentioned, there is 
also a statutory right of assignment under section 5 of the 
Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1856. This provides that the surety 
is entitled to have assigned to him "every judgement, specialty or 
other security which shall be held by the creditor" in respect of 
the debt. This reinforces the equitable right already mentioned. 
The combined effect of these two principles is that the surety 
virtually stands in the shoes of the creditor when he claims 
against the debtor. Thus if the creditor was entitled to priority 
in respect of his debt in the event of the debtor's bankruptcy, 
the surety will be entitled to the same priority (2). 
118. Scotland - The Mercantile Law Amendment Act does not apply to 
Scotland (and there is no provision equivalent to section 5 of it 
in the Mercantile Law Amendment (Scotland) Act. But under the 
common law of Scotland a cautioner (surety) who pays the debt is 
entitled to the assignation (assignment) of all the creditor's 
rights and securities against the debtor. 
Right of Contribution 
against Co-Sureties 
119. If there are two or more co-sureties and one of them pays more 
than his share, he is entitled to claim against the other (or 
others) for their shares (3). This principle is based on the law 
of restitution. It applies whether the co-sureties are joint, 
joint and several, or several. Where the sureties are joint (or 
(1) Forbes v. Jackson (1882) 19 Ch.D. 615. This may not be true in 
Scotland : see Gow, p. 316, citing Sligo v. Menzies (1840) 2 D. 
1478 at 1491 . 
(2) For example, a surety who pays a Crown debt is entitled to the 
Crown's rights of priority : Re Lord Churchill (1888) 39 Ch.D.174 
(3) If proceedings for contribution are instituted against the 
co-sureties, the debtor should also be made a party (unless he is 
bankrupt or otherwise unable to pay). This is to allow the court 
to establish the right of all the sureties to be indemnified by 
the debtor. See Hay v. Carter (1935) 1 Ch. 397. 
52 joint and several) each is, of course, liable to the creditor for 
the full amount but among themselves they are liable for equal 
shares unless they have agreed to a different division of 
liability. If the sureties are severally (separately) liable for 
only a portion of the debt, they cannot be made by the creditor to 
pay more than their share; but if one does pay the other surety's 
share, he can also claim a contribution. The right to a 
contribution arises whether the sureties are liable in the same 
contract or in different contracts ; and it makes no difference 
that one co-surety was unaware of the existence of the other. 
The only requirement is that they should be sureties for the same 
debt. If one co-surety becomes bankrupt the position at common 
law was that the surety who paid the whole debt had to bear the 
loss : i.e. if there are three co-sureties and one of them pays 
the whole debt and one of the others goes bankrupt, the third 
surety is required to contribute om/ one third of the debt. At 
equity, however, the liability was divided among the solvent 
sureties so that the other solvent surety would have to contribute 
one half of the debt. The equitable position now prevails (1). 
120. It is not clear whether there is a right of contribution in the 
case of an indemnity. There seems to be no reason why the same 
principles should not apply to co-indemnifiers; there would, 
however, be difficulties if sureties and indemnifiers were liable 
with regard to the same principal obligation : it is doubtful 
whether there could be a right of contribution between 
indemnifiers and sureties since the liability of the former might 
be greater than that of the latter (2). 
NOTE : See further on the whole of this chapter. 
Chitty, paras. 1700-09; 
Gow, pp. 314-6 ; 
Gloag and Henderson, pp. 225-7. 
(1) This is also the position in Scotland, 
(2) See Chitty, para. 1705. 
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PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
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(1) (1875) L.R. 10 Q.B. 525 at 537 (per Cockburn C.J.). 
(2) See Powlatt, p. 64 and Martin Wolff, Private International Law 
(1950) , p. 459. 
(3) (1852) 12 C.B. 801 (= 138 E.R. 1119). 
(4) See Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws (8th ed. 1967), p. 735 
n. 74 and p. 1098, n. 73. Leroux v. Brown has, however, been 
followed in other cases : Dicey and Morris, op. cit. p. 1098 n. 74 
34 Chapter 7 
DIFFERENCES IN THE LAW 
123. This chapter is concerned with those areas in which the law of the 
countries under study in this Report differs from the law of the 
other Member States. Only those differences that are significant 
from the point of view of this study will be considered. 
The Indemnity (1 ) 
124. Contracts of indemnity are fully recognised in the law of Britain 
and Ireland. They differ from a contract of suretyship in that 
the indemnifier undertakes an independent obligation, the scope of 
which is not limited to that of the debtor's obligation. This is 
advantageous to the creditor in those cases where the debtor might 
lack capacity to enter into the main contract and an indemnity 
would normally be used where the debtor is a minor. It should be 
noted that in Britain and Ireland (as in Germany) a contract of 
suretyship is void if the principal obligation is unenforceable as 
a result of the debtor's incapacity. It is perhaps of interest 
that in Germany, too, contracts of indemnity are recognised by the 
law. 
125. The legal principles applying to indemnities are unfortunately not 
as well developed as those applying to suretyships and a great 
deal probably depends on the terms of the contract. Many 
principles of the law of suretyship will apply by analogy but one 
important provision that does not is the Statute of Frauds : there 
is no necessity for a contract of indemnity to be in writing (2). 
(The Scottish equivalent of the Statute of Frauds is section 6 of 
the Mercantile Law Amendment (Scotland) Act 1856; it is probable 
that this also does not apply to an indemnity). 
Consideration (3) 
126. This doctrine is one of the special features of the English Common 
Law. It is part of the law in England and Ireland, but not in 
Scotland. In essence it requires that the creditor should do 
something (or refrain from doing something), or undertake some 
obligation, in exchange for the surety's entering into the contract 
of suretyship. It is probable that this rule will not cause many 
difficulties in practice where Community transactions are involved 
since in commercial transactions consideration normally exists 
anyway. It is probably unnecessary, therefore, to make any special 
provisions to deal with it. 
(1) See above, paras. 10-15. 
(2) There is a limited exception under the Hire Purchase Act 1965 
see above, para. 68. 
(3) Paras. 52-63. 
5 5 Writing (1 ) 
127. In Britain and Ireland contracts of suretyship must be in writing. 
Similar rules are found in the laws of other Member States. 
However, there are differences of detail. First, in Britain and 
Ireland writing is an evidentiary, not a formal requirement : an 
oral contract of suretyship is not void, but merely unenforceable. 
If the surety nevertheless pays, he cannot recover the money paid. 
In private international law the English rule is classified as a 
rule relating to evidence (procedure) . Since evidence is a matter 
for the lex fori, the English statute applies to all contracts of 
suretyship which are the subject of proceedings in English courts 
irrespective of the proper law of the contract. 
128. Secondly, it should be noted that the contract itself need not be 
in writing,a note or memorandum in writing (which may be made 
after the contract is entered into) is sufficient. Thirdly, the 
document must be signed by the surety. Fourthly, it does not 
apply to a del credere agent's obligations or any other suretyship 
agreement that is part of a wider transaction. Finally, it should 
be noted that contracts of indemnity need not be in writing 
(except insofar as they come within the provisions of the Hire 
Purchase Act 1965) (2). Under the Consumer Credit Bill 
indemnities will have to be in writing. 
Consumer Credit Legislation (5) 
129. There are various statutes designed to protect consumers from 
exploitation. In the U.K. these are to be replaced by the 
Consumer Credit Bill (which at the time of writing has not yet 
become law). The Bill requires suretyship and indemnity 
agreements to be in writing (if they come within its scope) and 
contains provisions concerning the form of documents and the right 
of the surety to be given copies of certain documents. It also 
provides that the creditor cannot obtain a greater benefit by 
claiming from a surety (or indemnifier) than he would get if the 
debtor fulfilled his obligations. This, of course, is a 
restatement of the principle that suretyship is an accessory 
obligation; but the Bill extends this principle to indemnities 
subject to one exception : where the debtor is a minor an 
indemnifier (but not a surety) is still liable as before. The 
Bill covers most consumer credit transactions where the sum in 
question is not over £5,000 and the debtor is not a corporation 
and will apply to a suretyship or indemnity if the principal 
obligation arises from a transaction within the scope of the Bill. 
(1) Paras. 64-70 
(2) This applies only in England. For the other countries covered 
by this Study, see above, paras. 80a, b and c. 
(5) Paras. 77-84. 
36 Non-Subsidiary Character (1 ) 
130. In Britain and Ireland the creditor is not obliged (in the absence 
of an agreement to the contrary) to take any legal proceedings 
against the debtor before claiming against the surety. It is 
probably only in rare cases that the parties would agree in the 
contract of suretyship that proceedings must first be taken 
against the debtor. 
Incapacity of Debtor (2) 
131. If the principal obligation is unenforceable against the debtor 
because he lacks capacity, the surety is not liable. This rule 
does not apply where the contract is one of indemnity, not 
suretyship. 
S e t - O f f (3) 
152. The English law of set-off is different from both the Roman Law 
and the German Law. In England set-off does not in itself 
extinguish a claim unless a court has given judgement to this 
effect. Set-off is not the fulfilment of an obligation, it is 
merely an excuse for non-performance. In other words it is a 
defence which may be raised by a debtor if he is sued for the debt. 
Of course, the parties may agree, in a situation in which a 
possibility of set-off exists, that the two debts will be 
cancelled. It should, however, be noted that a debtor is not 
obliged to plead set-off; if he wishes he can pay the debt he owes 
and then enforce that owing to him by action. 
133. In the case of suretyship, if a situation of set-off exists 
between debtor and creditor, the surety can, if he is sued by the 
creditor, plead any set-off arising out of the same transaction as 
the secured claim that could have been pleaded by the debtor. It 
is uncertain whether he could plead a set-off arising out of a 
different transaction though if the debtor is a party to the 
proceedings (and the surety has. the right to have him joined as a 
party), the debtor can plead such a set-off. It is unclear what 
would happen if the debtor refused to plead the set-off or if the 
creditor paid the debt owed by him and thus precluded the 
possibility of set-off. 
Extension of Time (4) 
134. If the creditor allows the debtor further time in which to pay 
(or otherwise perform his obligation) the surety is discharged 
even if he suffers no prejudice. There are two exceptions to this 
this : first, if the contract of suretyship gave the creditor 
(1) Paras. 85-6 
(2) Paras. 18-22. 
(3) Para. 105. 
(4) Paras. 94-5. 
37 the right to grant an extension; secondly, if the creditor informs 
the debtor when he gives the extension that he is reserving his 
rights against the surety (where this is done the surety can pay 
the debt when it was originally due and demand immediate repayment 
from the debtor). This rule of British and Irish law has been 
strongly criticised and it is common practice to avoid it by 
inserting a special clause in the contract of suretyship to allow 
an extension of time (1). It would be desirable to abolish it to 
bring British and Irish law into line with that of other Member 
States . 
Prescription (2) 
155. There are some differences in the law relating to prescription : 
in England the period is six years from the date when the 
surety became liable; in Scotland, under the Cautioners Act of 
1695, there is a period of seven years from the date of the 
contract of suretyship. However, since differences in tV>° law 
relating to prescription in the other Member States were not 
regarded by the Max-Planck-Institut as being important enough to 
warrant a uniform rule (5), no more need be said on this topic. 
Time Limit 
156. If a surety agreed to enter into a continuing suretyship for a 
given period, this would normally be interpreted in Britain and 
Ireland as meaning that he will guarantee all debts contracted by 
the debtor during that period (4) ; it would not oblige the 
creditor to assert his claims against the surety during the period 
in question. If, however, there was a specific agreement to this 
effect, it would be strictly enforced by the courts : no period of 
grace would be allowed. 
Indeterminate Surety (5) 
157. The question whether the surety can revoke an indeterminate 
continuing surety depends on the terms of the contract of 
suretyship and the nature of the consideration. If the surety 
effectively binds himself to enter into such a suretyship it is 
doubtful whether he can revoke it. (In normal banking practice, 
there is usually a clause in the contract allowing the surety to 
revoke it on giving notice of, say, three months) (6). The right 
(1) See Holden, pp. 513-4. 
(2) Paras. 102-4'. 
(3) Para. 148. 
(4) It is a common clause in a contract for a continuing suretyship 
that the surety may revoke his obligation on giving the creditor a 
certain period of notice (e.g. three months). For the effect of 
such a clause (including the question whether further advances can 
be made to the debtor after notice has been given but before it 
has expired) see Holden, pp. 227-8. 
(5) Paras."73-6 
(6) Holden, loc, cit. of denunciation found in German and Netherlands law has no 
counterpart in Britain and Ireland. 
Bankruptcy of Debtor (1 ) 
138. The differences in the law in this area are concerned mainly with 
the question whether a surety who has paid only part of the debt 
can claim against the estate of a bankrupt debtor. There are also 
differences on this point in the law of the six Member States 
covered in the Max-Planck-Institut Report (2). However, there is 
probably no need to have any uniform rule on the matter. 
(1) Paras. 114-5. 
(2) Paras. 155, 156. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
Chapter 8 
COMMENTS ON DRAFT DIRECTIVE 
(These comments are based on the English version of the 
provisional draft of articles 1 to 11 as agreed on 28 September 
1975 (XI/494/73-E)). 
Field of Application 
139. Scottish Law - A general problem of terminology arises in the 
English language version of the Directive with regard to Scottish 
terminology. As will be clear from this Report, the Scottish law 
on this subject is, with regard to most questions, the same as the 
English and Irish law. However, the terminology is often 
different. Thus the normal Scottish term for "suretyship" is 
"cautionary obligation" and for "surety" is "cautioner". The 
English terminology is often used in Scotland but it might be 
thought desirable to include the Scottish terminology as an 
alternative in the English version of the directive : e.g. 
(a) suretyship (cautionary obligation), 
I suggest that wherever the terms "surety" or "suretyship" are 
used the Scottish equivalents be added in brackets. 
140. Paragraph 1 (b) : As explained previously, in England ant' Ireland 
the term "guarantee" normally means exactly the same as 
"suretyship". The term "indemnity" should therefore be used in 
the English language version. 
141. Paragraph 1(d) : There is no equivalent in British or Irish law to 
this concept of German and Italian law. (See above, paras. 41-2). 
142. Paragraph 2(a) : In English and Irish law there is a distinction 
between "joint liability" and "joint and several liability" (1). 
In Scotland the appropriate term is "liability in solidum" (2) . 
It would be desirable for this paragraph to read, in its English 
version 
(a) mere joint, or joint and several liability 
(liability in solidum). 
(1) See above, paras. 25-5. 
(2) See above paras. 30-4. 
41 Article 1 
143. There is, of course, no difficulty in declaring that Member States 
must not discriminate against nationals of other member States (or 
persons resident in other Member States). If, however, it is 
desired to prevent private persons from discriminating on this 
ground, it might be rather difficult to enforce the Directive in 
practice since creditors normally reserve the right to reject any 
proposed surety without having to give reasons. 
Article 2 
144. This article would bring about certain changes in British and 
Irish law. To explain these clearly it is desirable to summarise 
briefly the present position (1). In British and Irish law the 
requirement of writing is based purely on statute. There are two 
groups of statutes : 
1. The Statute of Frauds and its equivalents : These are the 
Statute of Frauds 1677, section 4 (applicable in England); 
the Statute of Frauds (Ireland) 1695, section 2 
(applicable in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of 
Ireland) and the Mercantile Law Amendment (Scotland) Act 
1856, section 6 (applicable in Scotland). All these are 
of similar effect and will be referred to simply as "the 
Statute of Frauds". 
145. The Statute of Frauds does not apply to a suretyship agreement 
which is an incident in a wider transaction and for this reason 
does not apply to the obligation undertaken by a del credere 
agent. It also does not apply to a contract of indemnity. 
146. 2. Other legislation. Certain other statutes of limited 
scope also require writing.At the present time the relevant 
statute in England is the Hire-Purchase Act 1965 (2). In 
the U.K. these provisions will be soon replaced by the 
Consumer Credit Bill (not yet enacted) (3). These 
provisions apply only if the principal obligation 
guaranteed by the suretyship comes within the scope of the 
Act in question. 
147. The following points should be noted about the Statute of 
Frauds (4) : 
1. The contract itself need not be in writing provided there 
is a note or memorandum in writing setting out the terms 
of the contract. This may be made after the contract has 
been entered into. Under the draft Directive the contract 
itself will have to be in writing. 
(1) See above paras. 64-70. 
(2) See above, paras. 77-80. 
(3) See, above, paras. 81-4. 
(4) See above, paras. 64-70. 
42 2. Under the Statute of Frauds the person bound, i.e. the 
person against whom the contract is enforced (usually the 
surety) must sign it personally or someone duly authorised 
by him must sign it. This is not specifically dealt with 
in the draft Directive. It is suggested in the Max-Planck-
Institut Report (comment 3, p. 175) that the concept of 
written form is uniformly construed to include signature 
of the document. It is not certain that this is the case 
in English law. 
Another point that is not clear in the draft Directive is 
whether both parties must sign it or only the party 
against whom it is enforced. Presumably under the draft 
Directive signature by an agent would be sufficient if the 
agent was authorised to sign. 
3. The exceptions to the Statute of Frauds (indemnities, del 
credere agents, suretyships which are an incident of a 
wider transaction) would no longer apply under the draft 
Directive. This would probably be desirable. The fact 
that a contract of indemnity - a more onerous transaction 
than a contract of suretyship - need not be in writing has 
long been a subject of criticism. 
4. The Statute of Frauds is evidentiary, not a condition 
precedent to validity. 
5. Part performance by the surety probably does not make the 
contract enforceable but it is probable that money paid by 
a surety under an oral contract cannot be recovered by him 
from the creditor (1) 
148. The following points should be made about the draft Directive : 
1. When the draft Directive comes into force the Statute of 
Frauds would probably be repealed. There should be no 
difficulty about this. However, there would be great 
difficulties in the way of altering the provisions of 
clause 100 of the Consumer Credit Bill (which nrovides for 
regulations to be made to prescribe the form and content 
of a document creating a security if the principal 
obligation comes within the scope of the Bill) . The 
purpose of these regulations is to make it clear to the 
surety exactly what his rights and obligations are, i.e. 
to prevent onerous clauses being put in very small print 
and hidden in an obscure part of the document. It would 
obviously be undesirable to lessen the protection given by 
these provisions and it is likely that they would have to 
apply in addition to the general provisions of the draft 
Directive. It should, however, be stressed that the 
Consumer Credit Bill will apply only to certain suretyships. 
(See Part II of the Bill). 
2. The third sentence of paragraph 1 is not entirely clear. 
According to the Max-Planck-Institut Report (2) the purpose 
of this provision is to prevent the surety having the right 
to reclaim money paid under an oral contract. This is 
(1) See above, para. 66. 
(2) Comment 4, pp . 17 5-6 
^3 probably already the law in England (1). The problem, 
however, is what happens if the surety pays only part of 
the debt. Clearly under the draft Directive he would not 
be able to reclaim what he has already paid, but would the 
creditor then be able to enforce the obligation as to the 
rest of the debt? This is probably not the law in England 
(though there would be no difficulty in introducing such a 
rule if this were thought desirable). Clarification on 
this point is needed. 
Paragraph 2 would probably not be applicable to Britain 
and Ireland since the Satute of Frauds is not a condition 
precedent to validity. It should also be mentioned that 
in Britain and Ireland there is no separate commercial 
code and no general concept of a merchant or trader. 
There would consequently be difficulties in introducing 
special provisions for merchants (traders) . 
Article 
First Sentence 
149. This accords with present British and Irish law. Of course, the 
parties can agree either that the surety shall be under a greater 
liability than the principal debtor (in which case the contract is 
not one of suretyship but one of indemnity) or that the surety 
shall be under a lesser liability (for example by limiting his 
liability to a specified sum). 
Second Sentence 
150. This is also in accord with the present British and Irish law. 




151. It has already been mentioned that the theory of set-off in 
English law is different from that in both the Roman Law countries 
and in Germany (2). 
152. In British and Irish law a surety can benefit from a set-off 
available to the debtor against the creditor if the debt to be set 
off arises out of the same transaction as the secured claim. It 
is doubtful, however, whether he can claim a set-off arising out 
of a different transaction. 
(1) See above, para. 66. 
(2) See above, paras. 132-5. 
44 153. The debtor can, of course, claim such a set-off if he is sued by 
the creditor. If, therefore, the surety is sued by the creditor, 
he can have the debtor made a party to the proceedings and the 
debtor can then claim the set-off. If, however, the debtor 
refuses to claim the set-off, it is doubtful whether the surety 
can claim it (1). 
154. It is unclear what the position in British and Irish law is where 
the creditor pays a debt due by him that might have been set-off 
against the secured claim. 
155. The Commission should consider whether the surety should be given 
the right to benefit from a set-off available to the debtor which 
arises out of a different transaction. 
156. Scotland - The Scottish term for "set-off" is "compensation". 
NOTE : For a discussion of the general principles of set-off in 
English law (not in relation to suretyship) see Odgers on 
Pleading and Practice (20th ed. 1971), chap. 14. 
Paragraph 2 
157. Sub-paragraph (a) : "his own debt". This should read "the debt 
owed to him". [As it stands it is ambiguous and would probably be 
read to mean "the debt owed by_ him") . 
158. Sub-paragraph (b) : it is unclear what would constitute "proper 
grounds'. It has already been stated that in British and Irish 
law set-off only arises where an action is brought; even in this 
case the defendant cannot be obliged to plead set-off : in other 
words he always has the right not to claim it. 
159. It should finally be said that this whole Article is based on the 
concept of set-off which exists in the law of the Continental 
Member States and it does not fit easily into the structure of 
British and Irish law. 
Article 5 
160. The purpose of this Article is unclear. Is it intended to be a 
rule of interpretation to be applied only when the intention of the 
parties as expressed in the contract is unclear; or is it intended 
to apply even if the parties expressly agreed to something 
different? 
161. There are three separate things that the parties may agree upon : 
1. They may agree that the surety will be liable only for 
debts contracted during the period in question. 
2. They may agree that the surety will be liable only for 
debts due for payment during this period. 
(1) See above, para. 105. 
45 3. They may agree that the liability of the surety will 
terminate unless legal proceedings have been begun 
against him before the end of the period. 
In the first two cases the surety may be sued after the period has 
expired (subject to the law of prescription) : the parties are 
concerned only with establishing for which debt he is liable. 
162. If the Article is intended to do more than establish a rule of 
interpretation, it would apply only where it is unclear from the 
contract which of these three possibilities the parties agreed 
upon. As the Article is now drafted, however, it might be 
regarded as having the effect of transforming an agreement of type 
1 or 3 into one of type 2 (notwithstanding the fact that Article 5 
is not mandatory). If it is intended to do no more than lay down 




163. It might be better from a stylistic point of view for the word 
"Except" to replace the word "Subject". It would also be 
desirable to state expressly that the termination will not be 
effective until the creditor has been informed (or that the way in 
which the termination is to be effected is by the surety informing 
the creditor). 
Paragraph 3 
164. There are a number of ways in which this paragraph is unclear. 
May the parties agree that a fixed period of notice must be given? 
(It might be better to say "... that notice must be given before 
the termination takes effect."). May they agree that the right 
to terminate shall not be exercised during a fixed period 
(provided that the period is reasonable)? 
165. According to Article 10, this Article is mandatory. However, 
since Article 6 does not apply to a suretyship entered into for a 
fixed period, the parties could circumvent its provisions by 
agreeing that the suretyship shall continue for a very long fixed 
period (e.g. 99 years). It should be noted that English law does 
not recognise any general principle of abuse of rights or evasion 
of the law; consequently even if it were quite clear that the 
purpose of stipulating such a long term was to deprive the surety 
of the right to terminate, the agreement would still be quite 
valid (1). 
(1) In-Scotland the suretyship cannot normally last for more than 7 
years; see above para. 104. 
46 Article 7 
Paragraph 1 
166. The phrase "deteriorated substantially" is very vague. Presumably 
it is something less than bankruptcy but it would not be easy for 
an English court to apply this provision as it is now drafted. It 
would again be desirable to state that termination is to be 
effected by informing the creditor. 
Paragraph 3 
167. See the suggested reformulation of para. 5 of Article 6. 
There seems to be no reason why Article 7 should be mandatory (see 
Article 10). If the parties wish to state expressly that the 
suretyship is to continue notwithstanding a deterioration in the 
debtor's financial position, what objection can be taken to 
holding the surety to his agreement? 
168 
Article 8 
Generally speaking in England the successful party in civil 
litigation is entitled to costs. This means that the unsuccessful 
party is obliged to pay the court fees, lawyer's fees and other 
expenses incurred by the successful party. Not all the expenses 
incurred are, however, included and there are rules as to what 
items of expenditure may be included and how much may be charged 
by lawyers for doing various things. In case of dispute there is 
a special procedure for assessing the costs which takes place 
before a court official. It should also be noted that the 
successful party is not automatically entitled to costs : he must 
ask the court to award costs and, if the court does this, the 
order for costs is part of the judgement. Costs normally are 
awarded to the successful party unless he is guilty of some 
misconduct. 
169. In view of this, the second alternative of Article 8 would have a 
much more precise meaning in England than the first alternative 
and would be preferable for this reason. 
170. It should be mentioned that, unless the creditor is obliged under 
the contract of suretyship to sue the debtor before claiming 
against the surety, it would be desirable for the creditor to sue 
both debtor and surety jointly : in this way the costs of two 
legal actions would be avoided. It could be argued that if the 
creditor fails, without good reason, to do this, he should not be 
entitled to recover the costs of both proceedings from the surety. 
171. Finally a drafting point : the phrase "after the liability of the 
surety had expired" appears to imply that the surety is no longer 
liable for the original debt. What presumably is meant is that, 
if under the contract of suretyship the surety is liable only for 
debts contracted (or payable) during a certain period of time, the 
fact that this period has expired does not prevent the surety 
being liable for costs incurred in connection with legal 
proceedings instituted against the debtor to recover a debt for 
47 which the surety is liable. I suggest that this be re-drafted so 
that its meaning is clear. 
Article 9 
172. Contracts of indemnity are recognised in British and Irish law 
(except as mentioned below) and it is, therefore, desirable that 
the draft Directive should confirm their validity. 
175. As already mentioned, the term "indemnity" alone should be used in 
the English language version (1). 
174. The Article does not contain a definition of an indemnity. Might 
this not be desirable in view of the fact that this term might not 
mean the same thing in all Member States (2)? 
175. As a general rule in British and Irish law there is no objection 
if the indemnifier wishes to undertake an obligation, the validity 
and extent of which are not dependent on the debtor's obligation. 
There are however, certain exceptions to this. First, if the 
principal contract is illegal or contrary to public policy (e.g. a 
contract to commit a criminal offence) it is probable that the 
indemnity would be invalid as well. Secondly, it is provided 
under clause 102 of the Consumer Credit Bill (not yet law) that 
where a security is given in relation to a principal obligation 
that is regulated by the Bill, the security cannot be enforced to 
allow the creditor to obtain a greater benefit than he would 
obtain if the debtor under the principal obligation carried out 
his obligations to the extent to which they would be enforced 
under the Bill. There is one exception to this under sub-clause 
(6) which concerns the case where the debtor is a minor (3). 
176. It would be desirable for Article 9 to be drafted in such a way as 
not to affect either the rule concerning illegal contracts or the 
provisions of the Consumer Protection Bill. 
177. Finally there seems to be a mistake in the third line of naragraph 
one (English version). Should it not be "the debtor's obligation" 
instead of "the indemnifier's obligation"? 
(1) See above paras. 4 and 5 
(2) The following is a suggested definition : a contract of indemnity 
is a contract (not being a contract of insurance) in which one 
person (the indemnifier) agrees with another (the beneficiary) 
that he will make good any financial loss suffered by the 
beneficiary as a result of his entering or having entered into a 
contract or purported contract with a third party (the debtor) . 
Such loss may result either from the fact that the contract or 
purported contract was wholly or partly invalid or unenforceable 
or from the fact that the debtor failed to carry out his 
obligations under it. 
(3) See' above para. 82-83. 
48 Article 11 
178. Paragraphs 1 and 2 present no difficulty. 
179. It might be desirable for the question of formalities to be dealt 
with expressly. Whether this is a problem will depend on the 
final form of Article 2. If one uniform rule is laid down for the 
whole Community no question of conflict of laws within the 
Community could arise. If however, certain questions are left to 
national legislation, conflict of laws problems could arise. 
180. It should be remembered that in England the Statute of Frauds is 
classified as being a procedural requirement (1). It would be 
desirable to provide, therefore, that all provisions concerning 
writing should be classified, for the purposes of private 
international law, as formal requirements (even if they are 
regarded as matters of evidence for the other purposes). For 
example : if it were eventually decided that the question whether 
a contract by telex satisfies the requirements of Article 2 is to 
be decided by national legislation, it would be undesirable if the 
national legislation of the forum were applied instead of the law 
applicable under Article 11. If an English court classified the 
new requirement laid down by Article 2 in the same way as the 
Statute of Frauds it would mean that the English rule would be 
applied to all proceedings brought in an English court. I 
therefore suggest a provision as follows : 
"Any provision of the law of any country requiring that 
a contract of suretyship (or a note or memorandum thereof) 
is to be in writing or prescribing the form of the 
document embodying such a contract is to be classified 
for the purposes of private international law (but not 
necessarily otherwise) as being a requirement of form." 
181. The Commission might like to consider whether there should be a 
specific provision to the effect that a contract of suretyship is 
tc be valid as to form if it complies with either the system of 
law governing the contract under Article 11 or tïïe law of the 
place where the contract is made. This rule is probably part of 
the law of all the Member States (2) and it may therefore be 
unneccessary to deal with it expressly. 
182. If such a rule were introduced it would be desirable to define 
what the locus contractus is in those cases where the parties are 
not in the same place when a contract is concluded. The rule in 
English law is that when a contract is concluded by a non-
instantaneous form of communication, e.g. by post, the locus 
contractus is the place where the offeror posts his letter of 
acceptance. If an instantaneous form of communication such as 
telephone or telex is used, the locus contractus is the place 
where the offeror receives the acceptance (3). 
(1) See above, para. 122. 
(2) For England, see Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws 
(8th ed. 1967) , pp. 749-54. 
(3) See Dicey and Morris, op. cit., p. 193. 
49 183. I assume that the rules for defining the locus contractus may be 
different in other Member States. If it Ts thought desirable to 
have a uniform rule, there are various possible solutions to this 
problem that could be adopted. A general question of policy that 
would have to be decided is whether the rule should be designed 
to validate transactions wherever possible or to protect the 
surety. 
184. Another question is the scope of the law laid down by Article 11. 
Would it, for example, govern the right of a surety who has paid 
the debt to be indemnified by the debtor? If the right of 
indemnification arises from a contract between the surety and the 
debtor, it could be argued that the law governing that contract 
should decide the matter. If there is no such contract, it might 
be argued that the law governing the restitutionary claim 
(quasi-contractual obligation, unjust enrichment) should govern. 
It would be unfortunate if this were a different law from that 
governing the surety's liability to the creditor since a surety 
who was liable to the creditor under that law might find that he 
had no right to indemnification under the law governing the 
restitutionary claim. 
185. Presumably the law governing the suretyship would decide whether a 
surety who pays the debt is subrogated to the rights of the 
creditor; but what law decides whether the surety is entitled to a 
contribution from a co-surety? One assumes that this is also 
decided by the law governing the suretyship but what if the two 
sureties entered into separate contracts of suretyship which are 
governed by different systems of law? 
Proposed New Article 
186. It has already been mentioned that in British and Irish law an 
extension of time given to the debtor by the creditor normally has 
the effect of releasing the surety (1). I propose that this rule 
be changed so as to bring British and Irish law into line with 
that of the other Member States. The new Article should apply 
only in the absence of an exnress agreement on the point in the 
contract of suretyship. It should also provide that, if an 
extension of time is given to the debtor, the surety shall have 
the right either to require the debtor to pay the debt at the date 
when it was originally due or to pay the debt himself when it was 
originally due and claim indemnification from the debtor. 
(1) See above, paras. 94-5 and 154. 




The following are cited by the name of the author alone : 
- Charlesworth ' s Mercantile Law (11th ed. 1967 by CM. Schmitthoff and 
D.A.G. Sarre). A basic general work with a chapter on suretyships. 
- Chitty on Contracts ; vol. 11 : Specific Contracts (23rd ed. 1968). 
Chap. 13 deals with suretyship and indemnity. TEis is probably the 
best work on the subject. 
- W.M. Gloag and R.C. Henderson, Introduction to the Law of Scotland 
(7th ed. 1968). A standard general work on Scottish law. 
Chap. 19 deals with suretyship. 
- R.M. Goode, Hire-Purchase Law and Practice (2nd ed. 1970). Chap. 22 
deals with suretyship and indemnity. The book is primarily concerned 
with guarantees and indemnities in relation to hire-purchase but 
there is a great deal of useful general information. 
- J.J. Gow, The Mercantile and Industrial Law of Scotland (1964). 
Chap. 5 deals with suretyships in Scottish law. 
- Hals. = Halsbury's Law of England (3rd ed. 1957) Vol. 18. This is an 
encyclopaedia of English law. Suretyship is dealt with in Vol. 18. 
- J.M. Holden, The Law and Practice of Banking : Vol. 11 Securities for 
Bankers'Advances (5th ed. 1971) Part V deals with suretyship. 
- Sir Sidney Rowlatt, The Law of Principal and Surety (5rd ed. 1956 by 
A.A. Mocatta). This book is not very satisfactory but it is the only 
full-length study on the subject published in England. 
Community Studies 
The following abbreviations have been used in citing Community studies : 
"Max-Planck-Institut Study" = Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und 
internationales Privatrecht, The Suretyship in the Law of the Member 
States of the European Communities (1969). 
"My Report on Property" = Trevor C. Hartley, Study on the internal law 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the field 
of property law (197 2) . 
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STATUTES 
Confusion can be caused by the number of parliaments involved. In this 
Appendix the parliament which passed a particular statute will be 
indicated by the following abbreviations inserted after the date of the 
statute : 
U.K. = The United Kingdom Parliament. For the sake of convenience this 
abbreviation will cover the following : 
i. English Parliament (up to 1707); 
ii. Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
(i.e. England and Scotland) (1707 - 1801); 
iii. Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland (i.e. England, Scotland and the whole of Ireland) 
(1801 - 1922) ; 
iv. Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland (1922 to the present day). 
Scot. = Scottish Parliament (up to the Union with England in 1707). 
Irl. = The Irish Parliament (covering the whole of Ireland; 
abolished in 1801) . 
N.I. = The Parliament of Northern Ireland (established in 1922; 
suspended in 1972). 
R.I. = The Parliament of the Republic of Ireland (known as the "Dail"; 
established in 1922). 
It is important to note that the statutes of the U.K. Parliament may 
apply only to England, only to Scotland or to the whole of the U.K. 
Statutes passed before 1922 may also apply to the Republic of Ireland. 
A.TABLE OF STATUTES 
Paragraph 
Bankruptcy Act 1914 (U.K.) ss.16(20), 28(4) 91 
Cautioners Act 1695 (Scot.) 104, 155 
Hire-Purchase Act 1965 (U.K.) 
S.14 (1) 79 
s.22 68, 79 
S.54 (1)(c) 79 
S.35 79 
S.58 (1) 68, 79 
Hire-Purchase Act 1946 (R.I.) 69, 80c 
Hire-Purchase Act 1960 (R.I.) 69, 80c 
Hire-Purchase Act 1966 (N.I.) 69, 80b 
Hire-Purchase (Scotland) Act 1965 (U.K.) 70, 80a 
52 Paragraph 
Infants Relief Act 1874 (U.K.) 
5.1 18, 48 
5.2 48 
Law of Property Act 1925 (U.K.) 
S.40 64 
Limitation Act 1939 
s.2 102 
Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1856 (U.K.) 
5.3 62, 67 
5.5 117, 118 
Mercantile Law Amendment (Scotland) Act 1856 (U.K.) 




Misrepresentation Act 1967 (U.K.) 71 
Partnership Act 1890 (U.K.) 
S.18 106 
Statute of Frauds 1677 (U.K.) 
s.4 28, 64, 122, 
144, 180 
Statute of Frauds (Ireland) 1695 (Irl.) 
s.2 69, 144 
B.TEXTS OF SELECTED STATUTES 
The Statute of Frauds 1877 (U.K.) 
This applies only in England; but identical provisions apply to both 
parts of Ireland by virtue of Section 2 of the Statute of Frauds 
(Ireland) Act 1695 (Irl.); a similar (but not identical) provision 
applies to Scotland by virtue of section 6 of the Mercantile Law 
Amendment (Scotland) Act 1856 (U.K.) (below). 
"4. ... no action shall be brought ... whereby to charge the defendant 
upon any special promise to answer for the debt default or miscarriage 
of another person ... unless the agreement upon which such action shall 
be brought or some memorandum or note thereof shall be in writing and 
signed by the party to be charged therewith or some other person 
thereunto by him lawfully authorised." 
The Mercantile Law 
Amendment Act 1856 (U.K.) 
This applies to England and both parts of Ireland; it does not apply to 
Scotland. 
55 "5. No special promise to be made by any person ... to answer for the 
debt, default, or miscarriage of another person, being in writing and 
signed by the party to be charged herewith, or some other person by him 
thereunto lawfully authorised, shall be deemed invalid to support an 
action, suit, or other proceeding to charge the person by whom such 
promise shall have been made, by reason only that the consideration for 
such promise does not appear in writing, or by necessary inference from 
a written document." 
"5. Every person who, being surety for the debt or duty of another, or 
being liable with another for any debt or duty, shall pay such debt or 
perform such duty, shall be entitled to have assigned to him, or to a 
trustee for him, every judgement, specialty, or other security which 
shall be held by the creditor in respect of such debt or duty, whether 
such judgement, specialty or other security shall or shall not be 
deemed at law to have been satisfied by the payment of the debt or 
performance of the duty, and such person shall be entitled to stand in 
the place of the creditor, and to use all the remedies, and, if need 
be, and upon a proper indemnity, to use the name of the creditor, in 
any action or other proceeding, at law or in equity, in order to obtain 
from the principal debtor, or any co-surety, co-contractor, or 
co-debtor, as the case may be, indemnification for the advances made 
and loss sustained by the person who shall have so paid such debt or 
performed such duty, and such payment or performance so made by such 
surety shall not be pleadable in bar of any such action or other 
proceeding by him : Provided always, that no co-surety, co-contractor, 
or co-debtor shall be entitled to recover from any other co-surety, 
co-contractor or co-debtor, by the means aforesaid, more than the just 
proportion to which, as between those parties themselves, such last-
mentioned person shall be justly liable." 
The Mercantile Law 
Amendment (Scotland) Act 1856 (U.K.) 
This Act applies only in Scotland. 
"VI. From and after the passing of this Act, all Guarantees, Securities, 
or Cautionary Obligations made or granted by any Person for any other 
Person, and all Representations and Assurances as to the Character, 
Conduct, Credit, Ability, Trade, or Dealings of any Person, made or 
granted to the Effect or for the Purpose of enabling such Person to 
obtain Credit, Money, Goods, or Postponement of Payment of Debt, or of 
any other Obligation demandable from him, shall be in writing, and 
shall be subscribed by the Person undertaking such Guarantee, Security, 
or Cautionary Obligation, or making such Representations and Assurances, 
or by some Person duly authorised by him or them, otherwise the same 
shall have no Effect." 
"VII. No Guarantee, Security, Cautionary Obligation, Representation, or 
Assurance granted or made after the passing of this Act to or for a 
Company or Firm consisting of Two or more Persons, or to or for a 
single Person trading under the Name of a Firm, shall be binding on the 
Granter or Maker of the same in respect of anything done or omitted to 
be done, after a Change shall have taken place in any One or more of 
the Partners of the Company or Firm to which the same has been granted 
or made, or of the Company or Firm for which the same has been granted 
or made : Unless the Intention of the Parties that such Guarantee, 
Security, Cautionary Obligation, Representation, or Assurance, shall 
54 continue to be binding, notwithstanding such Change, shall appear 
either by express Stipulation, or by necessary Implication from the 
Nature of the Firm or otherwise." 
"VIII. Where any Person shall, after the passing of this Act, become 
bound as Cautioner for any Principal Debtor, it shall not be necessary 
for the Creditor to whom such Cautionary Obligation shall be granted, 
before calling on the Cautioner for Payment of the Debt to which such 
Cautionary Obligation refers, to discuss or do Diligence against the 
Principal Debtor, as now required by Law; but it shall be competent to 
such Creditor to proceed against the Principal Debtor and the said 
Cautioner, or against either of them, and to use all Action or 
Diligence against both or either of them which is competent according 
to the Law of Scotland : Provided always, that nothing herein contained 
shall prevent any Cautioner from stipulating in the Instrument of 
Caution that the Creditor shall be bound before proceeding against him 
to discuss and do Diligence against the Principal Debtor." 
"IX. From and after the passing of this Act, where Two or more Parties 
shall become bound as Cautioners for any Debtor, any Discharge granted 
by the Creditor in such Debt or Obligation to any One of such 
Cautioners without the Consent of the other Cautioners shall be deemed 
and taken to be a Discharge granted to all the Cautioners; but nothing 
herein contained shall be deemed to extend to the Case of a Cautioner 
consenting to the Discharge of a Co-cautioner who may have become 
bankrupt. 
The Hire-Purchase Act 1965 (U.K.) 
This Act applies only in England. Similar provisions apply in Scotland 
by virtue of the Hire-Purchase (Scotland) Act 1965 (U.K.); and in 
Northern Ireland by virtue of the Hire-Purchase Act 1966 (N.I.). All 
these Acts will be repealed (except for a small part of the N.I. Act) 
by the Consumer Credit Bill, if it becomes law. The law in the 
Republic of Ireland is somewhat different : see the Hire-Purchase Acts 
1946 and 1960 (R.I.). 
"14. (I) Where a notice of cancellation operates so as to rescind a 
hire-purchase agreement, a credit-sale agreement or a conditional sale 
agreement : 
(a) that agreement, and any contract of guarantee relating thereto, 
shall be deemed never to have had effect, and 
(b) any security given by the prospective hirer or buyer in respect of 
money payable under the agreement, or given by a guarantor in 
respect of money payable under such a contract of guarantee, shall 
be deemed never to have been enforceable." 
"22. (I) A contract of guarantee relating to a hire-purchase agreement, 
a credit-sale agreement or a conditional sale agreement, and any 
security given by a guarantor in respect of money payable under such a 
contract, shall (subject to the following provisions of this section) 
not be enforceable unless, within seven days of the making of the 
contract of guarantee or the making of the hire-purchase agreement, 
credit-sale agreement or conditional sale agreement, whichever is the 
later, there is delivered or sent to the guarantor : 
(a) a copy of the hire-purchase agreement, credit-sale agreement or 
conditional sale agreement, and 
55 (b) a copy of a note or memorandum of the contract of guarantee, being 
a note or memorandum signed by the guarantor or by a person 
authorised by him to sign it on his behalf. 
(2) Subject to the next following subsection, such a contract of 
guarantee, and any such security, shall also not be enforceable unless: 
(a) each copy delivered or sent as mentioned in the preceding 
subsection, and 
(b) the note or memorandum of the contract of guarantee, complies with 
the requirements of any regulations made under section 52 of this 
Act, in so far as any such requirements relate thereto. 
(5) If in any action the court is satisfied that a failure to comply 
with any requirement imposed by subsection (I) of this section, or with 
any such requirement as is mentioned in the last preceding subsection, 
has not prejudiced the guarantor, and that it would be just and 
equitable to dispense with that requirement, the court may, subject to 
any conditions that it thinks fit to impose, dispense with that 
requirement for the purpose of the action." 
"25. (I) Where a contract of guarantee relating to a hire-purchase 
agreement, a credit-sale agreement or a conditional sale agreement is 
for the time being in force, and the final payment under that agreement 
has not been made, any person entitled to enforce the contract of 
guarantee against the guarantor shall, within four days after he has 
received a request in writing from the guarantor, and the guarantor has 
tendered to him the sum of 2s.6d. for expenses, supply to the guarantor 
the documents specified in the next following subsection. 
(2) The documents referred to in the preceding subsection are : 
(a) a copy of the hire-purchase agreement, credit-sale agreement or 
conditional sale agreement, or, in the case of a credit-sale 
agreement under which the total purchase price does not exceed £50, 
a copy of any note or memorandum of the agreement ; and 
(b) a copy of a note or memorandum of the contract of guarantee ; and 
(c) a statement signed by, or by the agent of, the person to whom the 
request in writing referred to in the preceding subsection is made, 
showing the matters specified in paragraphs (a) to (c) of section 
21 (I) of this Act. 
(3) In the event of a failure without reasonable cause to comply with 
subsection (I) of this section, then, while the default continues, : 
(a) no person shall be entitled to enforce the contract of guarantee 
against the guarantor, and 
(b) no security given by the guarantor in respect of money payable 
under that contract shall be enforceable against the guarantor by 
any holder of that security, 
and, if the default continues for a period of one month, the person in 
default shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding 
£25. 
(4) If a copy supplied to a guarantor in pursuance of a request made by 
him under this section does not comply with such requirements of any 
regulations made under section 32 of this Act as relate thereto, the 
last preceding sub-section shall apply as if that copy had not been 
supplied to him. 
56 (5) Section 2 (4) of this Act applies to this section." 
"34. (I) The owner (where the agreement is a hire-purchase agreement) 
or the seller (where it is a conditional sale agreement) shall not 
enforce any right to recover possession of the protected goods from the 
hirer or buyer otherwise than by action. 
(2) If the owner or seller recovers possession of protected goods in 
contravention of the preceding subsection, the agreement, if not 
previously terminated, shall terminate, and : 
(a) the hirer or buyer shall be released from all liability under the 
agreement, and shall be entitled to recover from the owner or 
seller, in an action for money had and received, all sums paid by 
the hirer or buyer under the agreement or under any security given 
by him in respect thereof, and 
(b) any guarantor shall be entitled to recover from the owner or seller, 
in an action for money had and received, all sums paid by him under 
the contract of guarantee or under any security given by him in 
respect thereof." 
"58 (i) "contract of guarantee, in relation to a hire-purchase 
agreement, credit-sale agreement or conditional sale agreement, means a 
contract, made at the request (express or implied) of the hirer or 
buyer, either to guarantee the performance of the hirer's or buyer's 
obligations under the hire-purchase agreement, credit-sale agreement or 
conditional sale agreement, or to indemnify the owner or seller against 
any loss which he may incur in respect of that agreement, and 
"guarantor" shall be construed accordingly;" 
The Consumer Credit Bill 
The following extracts are taken from the Bill in the form in which it 
was after it had been amended by Standing Committee D in the last 
Parliament (5 February 1974). As a result of the General Election of 
March 1974, the Bill will have to be re-presented to Parliament. It 
will probably be passed eventually but may be further amended. 
If enacted, this Bill will apply throughout the United Kingdom. The 
Hire-Purchase Act 1965 (U.K.) and the Hire-Purchase (Scotland) Act 1965 
(U.K.) will be wholly repealed; the Hire-Purchase Act 1966 (N.I.) will 




100. (1) Any security provided in relation to a regulated agreement or 
linked transaction but not embodied in the executed agreement shall be 
expressed in writing. 
(2) The Secretary of State may make regulations prescribing the form 
and content of documents ("security instruments") to be made in 
compliance with subsection (1). (3) Regulations under subsection (2) may in particular : 
(a) require specified information to be included in the prescribed 
manner in documents, and other specified material to be excluded; 
(b) contain requirements to ensure the specified information is clearly 
brought to the attention of the surety, and that one part of a 
document is not given insufficient or excessive prominence compared 
with another. 
(4) A security instrument is not properly executed unless : 
(a) any regulations made by virtue of subsection (2) which apply to the 
instrument are complied with, and 
(b) a copy of the instrument is given to the surety, and to the debtor 
or hirer (if a different person), within seven days after it is 
executed, and 
(c) a copy of the executed agreement, together with a copy of any other 
document referred to in it (otherwise than in a provision not 
forming part of the regulated agreement), is also given to the 
surety within seven days after the instrument is executed, and 
(d) the instrument is signed by the surety. 
(5) If : 
(a) in contravention of subsection (1) a security is not expressed in 
writing, or 
(b) a security instrument is improperly executed, the security is 
enforceable against the surety on an order of the court only. 
(6) This section applies to a security provided in relation to a 
prospective regulated agreement or prospective linked transaction as it 
applies to one provided in relation to an actual regulated agreement or 
actual linked transaction, but where a security instrument is made in 
relation to a prospective regulated agreement, subsection (4)(c) shall 
apply with the substitution of "the regulated agreement is made" for 
"the instrument is executed". 
101. (1) Where a default notice is served on a debtor or hirer, a cony 
of the notice shall at the same be served by the creditor or owner on 
any surety. 
(2) If the creditor or owner fails to comply with subsection (1), the 
security is enforceable on an order of the court only. 
102. (1) In determining whether or not to make an order under section 
101 (2) the court shall consider, in addition to any other relevant 
factors : 
(a) how far, if at all, the surety has been prejudiced by the failure 
to comply with section 101 (1); 
(b) the degree of culpability for the default. 
("NOTE : Clauses 103-6 concern the duty of the creditor to give certain 
information to the surety and the debtor. Clause 107 is 
concerned with the realisation of securities.) 
58 108. (1) Where a security is provided in relation to an actual or 
prospective regulated agreement, the security shall not be enforced so 
as to benefit the creditor or owner, directly or indirectly, to an 
extent greater (whether as respects the amount of any payment or the 
time or manner of its being made) than would be the case if the 
security were not provided and any obligations of the debtor or hirer, 
or his relative, under or in relation to the agreement were carried out 
to the extent (if any) to which they would be enforced under this Act. 
(subsections (2) - (5) are omitted) 
(6) Where an indemnity is given in a case where the debtor or hirer 
not of full age and capacity, the reference in subsection (1) to the 
extent to which his obligations would be enforced shall be read in 
relation to the indemnity as a reference to the extent to which they 
would be enforced if he were of full age and capacity, 
(subsection (7) is omitted) 
Definitions 
The Consumer Credit Bill defines the following terms in clause 171 (1): 
"security", in relation to an actual or prospective consumer credit 
agreement or consumer hire agreement, or any linked transaction, means 
a mortgage, charge, pledge, bond, debenture, indemnity, guarantee, bill, 
note or other right which secures the carrying out of the obligations 
of the debtor or hirer under the agreement and is provided by him or at 
his request (express or implied) . 
"surety" means the person by whom any security is provided, or the 
person to whom his rights and duties in relation to the security have 
passed by assignment or operation of law. TABLE OF CONTENTS 
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